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ARISTOTLE'S DISCRIMINATION OF
SYNONYMS

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF GREEK LANGUAGE
AND LITERATURE

1932

By

WALTER HERMANN WENTE

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To Professor Paul Shorey, who suggested the subject of this dissertation in his seminar on Aristotle, the writer wishes to express his gratitude for constant encouragement and helpful counsel and criticism.



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This study in Aristotle's Discrimination of Synonyms does not aim to be an exhaustive discussion of Aristotle's vocabulary from the point of view of synonyms. Its purpose is rather to present contributions of Aristotle to the general study of Greek synonyms and, as far as possible, to ascertain, especially when the words discriminated are both synonyms and parts of his technical vocabulary, whether his distinctions are in accord with general Greek usage, particularly as represented in the literature of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. In this dissertation therefore an effort has been made to collect and discuss (1) passages containing formal discriminations, i.e. passages in which Aristotle sets off against each other, defines, and frequently discusses at length, words of related meaning, and also (2) incidental discriminations, i.e. passages in which the differences between the words are indicated by the context or qualifying terms. In the discussion are also included a selection of terms which Aristotle defines or otherwise elucidates, without distinguishing them from related terms, and some attention has been paid to words usually designated by Aristotle as *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*, i.e. words with more than one meaning. These also have been examined with reference to their relation to common Greek usage.

The material has been grouped according to content in the following four divisions: 1. Synonyms related to Aristotle's logical and metaphysical terminology; 2. Synonyms from Aristotle's philosophy of nature; 3. Synonyms from Aristotle's psychology; 4. Synonyms from Aristotle's ethics.

The following works of the Aristotelean corpus are included in this study: *Organon*; *Physics*; *De Caelo*; *De Generatione et Corruptione*; *Meteorologica*; *De Anima*; *Historia Animalium*; *De Partibus Animalium*; *De Generatione Animalium*; *Metaphysics*; *Nicomachean Ethics*; *Politics*; *Rhetoric*; *Poetics*.

The following translations of the works of Aristotle are cited: Hicks, *De Anima*; Rackham, *Nicomachean Ethics*; Freese, *Rhetoric*; Butcher, *Poetics*; for the remaining works, the *Oxford Translations*. Translated citations from other Greek authors are taken from the translations of the *Loeb Classical Library*, unless noted otherwise. In most citations the abbreviations of the *Dictionary of Liddell and Scott*, edition of 1925, are used.

I.

The writings of Aristotle in their present order begin with a discrimination of three related terms: ὁμώνυμος,—"equivocal", συνώνυμος,—"univocal", παρώνυμος,—"derived". ὁμώνυμα according to Cat.1a1 are things that have a common name but differing definitions. Thus "man" and "picture of a man" may both be called ζῷα, but not in the same sense; they are alike in name only but not in their essence; the definition corresponding with the name differs for each.¹ συνώνυμα are things which have both the name and the definition in common, e.g. "man" and "ox" are ζῷα both in name and essence; a συνώνυμον thus is a name that is common to all species under a genus or to both species and genus as far as they can be taken together under a common name.² παρώνυμα are things which derive their names from some other name but differ in termination, e.g. "grammar" and "grammarian".³ The distinction between ὁμώνυμον and συνώνυμον is not observed in common Greek usage.

¹ Cat.1a1-5. Cf. also Ph.248b7: οἷον διὰ τί οὐ συμβλητόν, πότερον δεύτερον τὸ γραφεῖον ἢ ὁ αἶνος ἢ ἡ νῆτις; ὅτι ὁμώνυμα. Top.106b1: καὶ τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖν ὁμώνυμον. Metaph.1034a22: the formal element(εἶδος),—the house itself are ὁμώνυμα. EN1129a30: οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεις ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αἰχνα τῶν ζῶων καὶ ἢ τὰς θύρας κλειουσιν. Cf. also Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p.197,12(ed.Bonitz): τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἃ ἔστι ἀπὸ τύχης. EN1906b27: τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμα("that bear the same name by chance").

² Cat.1a6-11. Cf. also EN1130b1: ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἅλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμός ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει... Top.123a28: συνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος. 127b5: σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ συνώνυμον τὸ γένος τῷ εἶδει; κατὰ πάντων γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν συνωνύμως τὸ γένος κατηγορεῖται. A somewhat different use appears Rh.1495a1: τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν...καὶ κυρίως καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. Sometimes A. uses ὁμώνυμον loosely in the popular sense of "having the same name", where according to strict usage συνώνυμον would be expected: Metaph.1086b24: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ BA ἐν εἶναι καὶ ἐκάστην τῶν συλλαβῶν μίαν, εἴπερ μὴ καθόλοι καὶ ἐν τῷ

συνώνυμον is rare outside of A.; it occurs Eur.Hel.495 in the sense of "bearing the same name".⁴ This is also the common meaning of δμώνυμον; however, a similarity may be observed between such Platon⁵ ionic passages as Phd.78E and Sph.234B and A.'s use of the word. For examples of παρώνυμον in harmony with A.'s use see Aesch.Eu.8, Pl.Sph.268C; for a somewhat different use Pl.Lg.757D.⁶

A.'s discussion of the sentence and its parts gives rise to a differentiation between λόγος, φάσις, κατάφασις, ἀπόφασις, and ἀπόφανσις. The first three are distinguished Int.16b26: "A sentence

εἶδει αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλὰ μία ἐκάστη τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ τὸς τι καὶ μὴ δμώνυμον (cf. Ross's note). Cf. also EN1129a30 and 1139b1 supra, where συνώνυμον is used in a similar context. Cf. also Metaph.1034b1: τρόπον τινὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, and 1070a4: ἐκ συνωνύμου γίνεσθαι οὐσία.

³ Cat.1a12-16. Cf. also Top.109b7: "A predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form (παρωνύμως)". EE1228a36: ὁ γὰρ θρασὺς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. In a wider sense Ph.207b7: ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἓνα, πλεῖω καὶ ποσ' ἄλλα· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη στήναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἁδιαίρετον· τὰ γὰρ δύο καὶ τρεῖς παρώνυμα ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος. Waitz ad Cat.1a11.

⁴ Eur.Hel.495: Λακεδαιμόνος δὲ γὰρ τὰς εὐωνύμους Τροιάς τ';

⁵ Phd.78E: τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων...ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; (cf. in A.'s more limited sense Metaph.1079b1: εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, δμώνυμα ἂν εἶη, καὶ μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἐπιβλέψας αὐτῶν...). Sph.234B: οὐκοῦν τὸν γ' ὑπισχνόμενον δυνατόν εἶναι μίαν τέχνην πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκόμενον τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ δμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατός ἐσται... Cf. also Il.17, 720: ἔχοντες δμώνυμοι (Aiantes). Thuc.2, 68: δμώνυμον τῇ αὐτοῦ πατρὶδι Ἄργος ὀνόμασας. Dem.19, 281. Pl.Rep.330B: πάππος δὲ καὶ ὁμώνυμος. Pind. Fr.71(Sandys 195) to Hiero of Syracuse: ζαθεῶν ἱερῶν δμώνυμος πάτερ, κτίστορ Αἴτνας. Isoc.11, 10. Pl.Lg.757B. Cra.405D.

⁶ Aesch.Eu.8: Φοῖβης ὄνομα' ἔχει παρώνυμον (sc. Φοῖβος). Pl.Sph.268C: μιμήτης δ' ὦν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνόμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήπεται.... δεῖ προσεῖπείν....αὐτόν....σοφίστην. Lg. 757D: ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ μὴν καὶ τοῦτοις παρωνυμίοις ποτὲ προσχρῆσθαι πόλιν ἅπασαν (employ this equality in a modified degree).

(λόγος) is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance (φάσις), though not as the expression of any positive judgement (κατάφασις)". κατάφασις is distinguished from the last two Int.17a25: "An affirmation (κατάφασις) is a positive assertion (ἀπόφασις) about something, a denial (ἀπόφασις) a negative assertion (ἀπόφασις)". For λόγος in the sense of "sentence" before A. of Pl.Sph.262C:..πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ρήματα κεράσῃ· τότε δ' ἤρμος ἐν τε καὶ λόγος (sentence) ἐγένετο εὐθύς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων (dis-course) ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ μικρότατος. Cf. also Pl.Tht.202AB. φάσις occurs with A.⁷ in three senses: 1. "term", "expression",⁸ "unconnected utterance"; 2. affirmation as opposed to negation; 3. in a wider sense: "statement", "assertion", including both affirmation and negation.⁹ Of these senses only the second is found outside of A.: of Pl.Sph.263E: "But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance has the name speech (κέκληται λόγος)? - True.- And in speech (λόγῳ) we know there is just affirmation and negation (φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν)?" Κατάφασις, "affirmation", does not occur before A.; for καταφάναι cf. Soph.O.T.505: ἀλλ' οὐποτ' ἔγωγ' ἂν, πρὶν ἰδοίμ' ὄρθον ἔπος, μεμφομένων ἂν καταφαίην. Plato uses ἀπόφασις and ἀπόφημι in A.'s sense; cf. Sph.257B: οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον δταν ἀπόφασις λέγεται, σημαίνει συγχωρησόμεθα.¹⁰ ἀπόφασις or ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος,¹¹ "assertion", "declaration", does not occur before A., but ἀποφαίνεσθαι, "to make a declaration" may be illustrated by Pl.Go.466C: ἥτερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγει καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, εἰ μὲ ἐρωτᾷς. Lys.214A.

"Ὄνομα and ρῆμα as constituent parts of the sentence are distinguished Int.16a18 ff.: "By a noun (ὄνομα) we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest.... A verb (ρῆμα, 1686) is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time:...'health' (ὕγια) is a noun, but 'is healthy' (ὕγιαται) is a verb". The combination ὀνόματα καὶ ρήματα is frequently used as a conventional description for the parts of speech and articulate speech in general;¹² and the con-

⁷ Int.17a17: τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα ἢ ρῆμα φάσις ἔστω μόνον. Cf. Metaph. 1051b23 for φάναι in this sense: ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψευδές, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθὲς (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτό κατάφασις καὶ φάσις) τὸ δ' ἄγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν.

⁸ Int.21b21: φάσις καὶ ἀπόφασις. A frequent use.

sistent use of these words as grammatical terms does not appear until later Greek. *ρῆμα* particularly is used in a wider sense as designating any word or combination of words appearing in the predicate.¹³ The background for A.'s usage is found in Plato; cf. *Sph.* 262A ff.: *ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων δίττον γένος. - πῶς; - τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.* - εἰπέτε ἑκάτερον. - τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι ὃν δῆλωμα *ρῆμα* που λέγομεν, ...τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνα πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθέν ὄνομα...οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

When words are combined into statements such as "the man runs", A. says that they are stated *κατὰ συμπλοκὴν* - "in combination", i.e. combination of words to form a proposition. This usage goes back to Plato and may be illustrated by *Sph.* 262C: τότε (i.e. when the individual names or words, - ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, - have been mingled) *ἡρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή,*

⁹ *Int.* 21b18: αἱ ἀντικείμεναι φάσεις.

¹⁰ Cf. also *Cra.* 426D: ἡ δὲ στίσις ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἰέναι βούλεται εἶναι. *Th.* 166A. *Prt.* 360D: οὔτε σὺ φῆς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης;

¹² Cf. *Dem.* 21, 183: οὐδὲν γὰρ *ρῆμα* οὐδ' ὄνομα οὕτως ἐστὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν χαλεπὸν, ὥς ὅς' ὑβρίζων τις τὸν ἐντυχόνθ' ὑμῶν διαπραττεται. *Pl. Ap.* 17B: οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία...κακαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους...ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν...Cf. Freese, *Transl. of A.'s Rhetoric ad Rh.* 1404 b15 and *Horace A.P.* 240: *nomina...verbaque.*

¹¹ *Int.* 17a7: ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἴτα ἀπόφασις.

¹³ Cf. A.'s indirect designation of an adjective as *ρῆμα* *Int.* 19b18: ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσματηγοῖται, ἤδη δίχως λέγονται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ ἔστι τρίτον φημὶ συγκεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταστάσει. Cf. also *Int.* 16a12. For the older and more general meanings of *ρῆμα*: "saying", "proverb", cf. Schmidt, *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache*, I, 66.97.116.

¹⁴ Cf. also *Cra.* 425A: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποιήσομεν, καὶ ἐν ἐπὶ ἐν, οὐ ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες ὁ δὲ συλλαβὰς καλοῦσι καὶ συλλαβὰς αὐτὴν συνθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τῆ τε ὀνόματι καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων συντίθενται· καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὄλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῶον τῇ γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ρητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. in a more general sense *Th.* 168B: καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψαι,

σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ ¹⁵πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος... ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· ἄνθρωπος μὴ θάινει... Another word frequently used by A. for the combination of subject and predicate into a sentence is σύνθεσις in one of its meanings. In its broadest sense this word as used by A. signifies any kind of combination. ¹⁶ The logical and grammatical sense that is similar to the meaning of συμπλοκή is illustrated by Int.16a12 ff.: "Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation (ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαίρεσως νοήματι); 'man' and 'white' as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false". ¹⁷ For a similar use of this word before A. cf. Aesch.Pr.460: καὶ μὴν ἀριθμὸν, ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων, ἐξηῦρον αὐτοῖς, γραμμάτων τε σύνθεσις; and Pl.Sph.263D: σύνθεσις τε ρημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων. Cra.431B: εἰ δὲ ρήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσις ἐστίν.

Int.17b16 ff. A. distinguishes the following terms that designate opposition between assertions: ἀντικείμενον, ἐναντίον, ἀντίφασις. In this distinction ἀντικείμενον is used in the narrower sense of ἀντικείμενον ἀντιφατικῶς- "contradiction", and ἐναντίον has the meaning of "contrary". Strictly speaking ἐναντίον is one of the subdivisions of ἀντικείμενον in the wider sense of "opposite", of which according to Cat.11b17 the subdivisions are ἀντικείμενον ὡς πρὸς τι (correlation: "double-half"), ὡς τὰ ἐναντία (contraries: "good-bad"), ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἔξις (privative-positive: - "blindness-sight"), and ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις (contradictories: "he sits-he does not sit"). ¹⁸ Int.17b16 the distinction is worked out as follows: "An affirmation (κατάφασις) is opposed

εἴτε ταύτῳ εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀΐσθησις, ἄλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτί, ἐκ συνηθείας ρημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσιν. Cf. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft, p.237.

¹⁵ Cf. also Tht.202B: ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. For the verb συμπλέκω in this sense cf. Sph.262D: οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ρήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. δῖο λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἵπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγγάμεθα λόγον.

¹⁶ Cf. e.g. EN1174a23: ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις (in building a temple) ἐτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ραβδόσεως. Po.1450a5: λέγω μῦθον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων... For σύνθεσις as distinct from κρᾶσις and μίξις see infra. Cf. also Ph.195a21 of the combination of form and matter: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὰ μέρη,

(ἀντικεισθαι) to a denial (ἀπόφασις) in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory' (ἀντιφατικῶς), when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation 'every man is white' is the contradictory of the denial 'not every man is white'...But propositions are opposed as contraries (ἐναντίως) when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentence 'every man is white', 'no man is white'".

ἀντικεισθαι and the noun ἀντίθεσις, which with A. corresponds in meaning to ἀντικεισθαι, are not common before A. Plato uses the three words Sph.²⁰ 257B, but not according to A.'s distinction, except for ἀπόφασις. Isocrates has ἀντίθεσις, but in the rhetorical sense: 12,2 (cf. Rh.1410a22). For the verb ἀντίφημι in the sense "to contradict" cf. Pl.Grg.501C: σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντιφῆς; For ἐναντίος used like A.'s ἀντικείμενος cf. Pl.Prt.339B: δοκεῖ δὲ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιήτης; Ar. Ach.493: ἄπασι μέλλεις εἰς λέγειν τὰναντία, and for ἐναντίος: loosely "opposite" cf. Pl.La.184D; X.Lac.1.2: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐ μιμησάμενος

τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὄλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος.

¹⁷ Cf. also De An.430a27: ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσις τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἔν ὄντων.. and b2: τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἔσθ' καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκὸν, τὸ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν συνέσθην..and for the verb Metaph.1012a4.

¹⁸ Cf. also Top.135b7-136a5.

¹⁹ Cf. also Int.17a26, Cat.13b27, APr.63b23, and for ἀντίφασις Int.17a31: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πάση καταφάσει ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη καὶ πάση ἀποφάσει κατάφασις. Καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι.

²⁰ Sph.257B ff.: οὐκ ἔρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγεται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μὴνυει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἅττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα... D:...ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μῦριον ἀντιτεθέμενον... E:...ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτὸ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω ἐμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν;... ὄντος δὲ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν. 258B: οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μωρίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἦττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντὶα γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις προέχουσιν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πατρίδα ἐπέδειξεν. Sop.Ant.667: ἅλλ' ὃν πόλεις στήσεις, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τάναντία. For a use similar to that of A. cf. Pl.Rep.491D: ἀγχοῦ γὰρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ αγαθοῦ.

The sentence or proposition as a part of the reasoning process is designated by a variety of terms which A. carefully distinguishes. Of these terms πρότασις is 1. a proposition (positive or negative; universal, particular, or indefinite: cf. APr.24a16); 2. in particular, a proposition as a part of a syllogism, a premiss (APo.77a37; APr.42a32). πρότασις is related to the verb προτείνω, which is also used in the sense of stating something as a premiss. πρότασις does not occur before A. in its technical sense. The origin of πρότασις is stated by Ammonius in the scholia on Int.96b26 as follows: ὡς ἀποφάνσεις μόνον ἐπισκέπεται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς ὡς μέρη τῶν συλλογισμῶν παραλαμβάνων ἅμα καὶ ὡς προτάσεις εἰκότως ἀξιῶσαι σκοπεῖν· ὡς γὰρ προτεινόμενους αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν συλλογίσασθαι τι βουλομένων τοῖς κοινωνοῖς τῶν λόγων, οὕτως οἱ πάλαιοι προτάσεις ἐπονομάζουσιν (Bonitz, Index.Ar.651a38). A non-technical use of προτείνω somewhat closer to A.'s than is found in the examples in note 21 may be seen in such passages as Isoc.6, 37: "Now that two good things (proposed courses of action) are set before us (δυσὶν προτεινόμενοι ἀγαθοῖν), the one evident, the other doubtful". 12,117: "...having the choice between two policies, neither of them ideal (δυσὶν πραγμάτων προτεινόμενοι) they considered it better to choose to do injury to others than to suffer injury themselves". Pl.Lg.895D: "...about everything that exists there are two questions (ἐρωτήσεις) to be asked. - How two? - At one time each of us, propounding (προτεινόμενον) the definition by itself, he demands (ἐρωτᾷν) the name". Ep.VII.343C: "The main point is this, that while there are separate things, the real essence (τὸ ὄν) and the quality (τὸ ποιόν), and the soul seeks to know not the quality but the essence, each of the Four proffers to the soul either in word or in concrete form (προτείνων τῇ ψυχῇ λόγῳ τε καὶ κατ' ἔργα) that which is not sought".

²¹For this use of προτείνω, "hold up for view" cf. e.g. HA525a28: (ὁ ναυτίλος) προτείνει τὰς πλεκτάνας. Pl.Phdr.230D: "For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves, so you, holding before me (προτείνων) discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica". Rep.382A: ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων; -- In accord with the scholiast's derivation Alex. explains Metaph.1089a25: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συλλαβισμῷ ἢ πρό-

διάστημα, relation of predication", as a technical term of logic in the strict sense is a proposition resulting from the combination of two terms as subject and predicate to form a premiss. πρότασις differs from it by being a designation for premisses of a certain kind, positive, universal, etc., whereas διάστημα designates nothing more than a combination of terms (AB and BA are different viewed as προτάσεις but not as διαστήματα). Cf. APr.42b10: "(in a chain syllogism) the relations of predication (διαστήματα) are one fewer than the terms related, and the προτάσεις will be equal in number to the διαστήματα". The distinction is not always observed by A., and we find διάστημα used loosely for πρότασις in such expressions as APr.26b21: διαστήματα κατὰ μέρος. 35a12: στερητικῶν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν διαστημάτων etc. The term does not occur outside of A. as designation of a combination of subject and predicate. It appears as ratio between numbers in a similar way Ph.202a19: "Just as the ratio (διάστημα) 1:2 is the same as the ratio 2:1 and the slope of a line is the same whether you regard it as sloping up or down - for in these cases we are dealing with one and the same thing which may be regarded or defined from two different approaches". With this cf. Archytas Fr.2(Diels p.261): μέσαι δὲ ἐντι τριῶν ταῖ μουσικαῖ, μία μὲν ἀριθμητικὰ, δευτέρα δὲ γεωμετρικὰ...ἀριθμητικὰ μὲν ὄκτα ἔωντι τρεῖς ὁροι κατὰ τὰν τοῖανύπεροχάν ἀνά λόγον· ὅι πρῶτος δευτέρου ὑπερέχει, τούτῳι δεύτερος...συμπλίπτει εἶμεν τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὄρων διάστημα μείον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μείζον. For the wider use of "interval between two things" cf. e.g. Ph.211b7: διάστημα μά τι τὸ μεταξύ τῶν ἐσχάτων. Epicur. Ep.2, p.370: διάστημα μεταξύ κόσμων. Of intervals in music Pl.Rep.531A: "They declare they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval (διάστημα) which should be the unit of measurement." Phlb.17C. A. Probl.922a6.

πρόβλημα and προβάλλω are distinguished from πρότασις and προτείνω Top.101a15.29. and 104a5 ff.²² πρόβλημα is a question or task proposed for investigation or solution. It deals with things

 ταςις by saying: οὐ γὰρ ἡ προτεινομένη καὶ γραφομένη γραμμή ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ καὶ τῇ ἀποδείξει παραλάμβανεται, ἀλλ' ἡ νοουμένη(806, 34). Cf. Ross's note.

²² Top.101b15.29: "For arguments (λόγοι) start with propositions (προτάσεις), while subjects on which reasoning (συλλογισμοί) take place are problems (προβλήματα)...The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of a phrase" (i.e. in question form a πρότασις is a simple question, a problem a double

that are in doubt, whereas πρότασις (in the wider sense) is a proposition that is either true in itself or (as a dialectical proposition) generally accepted and suitable as a basis for argument. πρόβλημα in this sense was current before A. Aristophanes has προβάλλω Nu.757: εὖ γ' ἄλλ' ἕτερον αὖ σοι προβαλῶ, τὸ δέξιον (good; now I'll proffer you another problem), and Plato has both the verb and the noun. For the verb cf. Rep.536D(in a more general sense): "...elements of instruction which are a preparation for dialectic should be presented (χρῆ πρόβλλειν) to the mind in childhood," also Sph.245B: αἴρεσιν χαλεπὴν προ βέβληκας. Chrm.162B: αἰνιγμα προὔβαλεν. Phlb.65D: εὐσχεπτον σκέψιν προβέβληκας. For the noun cf. Tht.180C(geometry); Rep.531C(music-mathematics). Sph.261A(a play on words): "...it certainly seems that what you said at first about the sophist, that he was a hard kind of creature to catch, is true; for he seems to have no end of defenses (προβλήματα) and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself".

ἐρώτημα and ἐρώτησις signify the act of questioning and the question itself as well as the result of the question in the form of an admission from the opponent, which is then used as premiss for further argument. Cf. APr.42a39; 24a25; Int.20b22 ff. In this sense ἐρώτημα and ἐρώτησις also appear as synonyms of πρότασις. The verb ἐρωτᾶν also appears as a technical term signifying "to question in dialectical argument" with the purpose of eliciting from the opponent a statement from which he can either be convinced or refuted. The verb and the nouns in the sense of the act of

question: πρότασις - ἄρὰ γὰρ τὸ ζῆλον πεζὸν δίδουν ὁρισμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου; -- πρόβλημα - πότερον τὸ ζῆλον πεζὸν δίδουν ὁρισμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου ἢ οὐ;);- 104a5: "...it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical, for no one would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of what is obvious: for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would assent". For the difference between dialectical πρότασις and dialectical πρόβλημα cf. 104a8: "Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion." 104b2: "A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses

questioning or the question itself in the course of an argument may be illustrated from Isocrates and Plato,²⁵ and a semi-technical sense reflecting a current usage in the language of dialectic appears Isoc.15,45²⁴ and Pl.Sph.225B.²⁵

ἄξιωμα as a logical term in its wider sense is an assumption on which an argument is based, and in this sense A. uses it as a synonym for λήμμα and πρότασις (Top.156a19: λήμμα. 159a4: πρότασις). In a more special sense it is a statement of "necessary self-grounded fact" (ὁ ἀνάγκη εἶναι δι' αὐτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη APo.76b22) which does not need demonstration (cf. APo.72a17; 76b21), such as the law of contradiction (Metaph.1005b33) and the axioms in the particular sciences (APo.75a41; 76b14; Metaph.997a11; 1005a20). ἄξιον in the wider sense is to accept something as a premiss, to assume, presuppose;²⁶ in the narrower sense it means²⁷ to demand that something be considered as self-evident truth. These words

hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves."

²³ For ἐρωτᾶν cf. Isoc.10,57: "Some might take offense and demand (ἐρωτήσεις) of me: 'How is it if we are so badly advised, that we are safe and hold power?'" 12,118: "A course which all sensible men would prefer, although a certain few of those who claim to be wise men, were the question put to them (ἐρωτηθέντες), would not accept this view". Pl.Prt.336D: διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος. Lg.895D: "At one time each of us propounding a name by itself ...demands the name (ἐρωτᾶν αὐ τοῦνομα)." For ἐρώτημα cf. Pl.Euthd. 275D: "Cleinias:- Which sort of men are the learners, the wise or the foolish?- At this the young man, feeling the embarrassment of the question (ἐρωτήματος), blushed and glanced at me in helplessness." Rep.538D: ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὼν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται· τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὁ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῇ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν καταβάλλῃ ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροῦν. For ἐρώτησις cf. Pl.Sph.251D: "Let us employ the form of questions (in arguments)"; Men.79C: "The question - what is virtue?". Smp.204D: "Your answer calls for a further question."

²⁴ Isoc.15,45: ἄλλοι δὲ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις γηγόνασιν, οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν: "Other men have occupied themselves with questionings and answers, whom they call disputatious."

²⁵ Pl.Sph.225B: "That controversy which is carried on among private

do not occur before A. in a technical sense. The use of ἀξίωμα in the sense of something that is thought right or fitting (e.g. Soph. O.C.1451: ματᾶν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα δαιμόνων ἔχω φράσαι. 1459: πάτερ, τί δ' ἐστὶ τἀξίωμ' ἐφ' ᾧ κλεῖς;) may be said to come nearest to A's technical usage. For ἀξιοῦν in the sense of "to make a claim, to consider right" cf. Isoc.1,21: "...if you manage your temper towards those who offend against you as you would expect (ἀξιώσετε) others to do if you offended them." 3,29: "...do not ~~think~~ that while other people live with sobriety, kings may live with license." 4,22: "...believe (ἀξιούσα) that the hegemony should be held by those who first won this honor." 81: "Thinking it right (ἀξιοῦντες) to abide by their covenants as by degrees of necessity." Dem.18, 255: ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτως περὶ τῆς τύχης ἀξιῶ. Pl.Hp.Mi.364D: εἰ ἄλλους μὲν αὐτὰ ταῦτα παιδεύω καὶ ἀξιῶ διὰ ταῦτα χρήματα λαβεῖν.

λημμα is an unproved assumption used as a premiss in a syllogism. As a direct statement in a demonstrative syllogism it is distinguished from ἐρώτημα, which is a protasis in answer to a question in a dialectical syllogism (cf. APr.24a24: "The demonstrator does not ask for his premiss, but lays it down (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων)"), and as a broad term for basic assumption it is distinct from ἰξίωμα, which in its narrower sense is an assertion of truth that is regarded as self-evident (as synonymous with ἀξίωμα in the broader sense Top.156a21). The verb λαμβάνω is broadly used for assuming without proof, and in this sense is a synonym of ὑποτίθεσθαι and αἰτεῖσθαι and the opposite of δεῖξαι (cf. APr.46b19; 64b29). This technical use of both verb and noun does not occur before A. An approach to it may be seen in the common use of the verb in the sense of "to take or understand a thing in a certain way." Cf. e.g. Hdt.7,142: οἱ γὰρ χρησμολδοὶ ταύτη ταῦτα ἐλάμβανον, ὡς ἔμπι Σαλαμῖνα δεῖ σφέας ἐσωθῆναι ναυμαχίην παρασκευασάμενος. Thuc.6,27: τὸ πρῶγμα μετρίως ἐλάμβανον, - "They took the matter seriously." 4,17: λάβετε τοὺς λόγους μὴ πο-

persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentative(ἀντιλογικά), are we not?"

²⁶ e.g. APr.69b5: "If a man maintain a universal affirmative."

²⁷ e.g. Ph.232a24: ἀξιοῦν ἀξίωμα. In this sense it occurs also as a synonym of αἰτέω Top.163a3.

²⁸ Top.156a19. ἥκιστα δ' ἂν διαρθροῖτο ὁ συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος μὴ τὰ τοῦτου λήμματα ἡμῶν τεθέντων, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ὅφ' ὧν ὁ συλ-

λεμίους. A.Pol.1296a30: τῆς νίκης ἄθλον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν. 1342b25: ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων (ἁρμονίᾳς) etc.

θέσις in the wider sense is any unproved assertion or proposition which, when used as a basis for argument, challenges proof and is not immediately true in itself.²⁹ In this sense it is distinguished from πρόβλημα Top.104b29 ff.: "Now a thesis also is a problem, though a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear; for it follows of necessity, from what has been said, that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves, seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion." In a somewhat more restricted sense θέσις is distinct from ἀξίωμα as an assumption on which demonstration rests, an unproved major premiss which is not in itself certain and necessary and therefore need not be accepted by everyone.³⁰ For the background in Plato for this use of θέσις cf. e.g. Rep.334E-335A: "I think we had better correct an error (μετατιθώμεθα) into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words friend and enemy (κινδυνεύομεν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὁρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι...)- What was the error (πῶς θέμενοι;)?- We should rather say that he is a friend who is as well as seems good and that he who seems only and is not good,

λογισμὸς γίνεται. 183a15: ὁ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐηθής...ἐὰν ᾗ λίαν ἄδοξα ἢ ψευδῆ τὰ λήμματα.

²⁹Cf. e.g. Top.194b19 ff.: "A thesis is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion, e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said, or the view of Heraclitus, that all things are in motion." Cf. also the phrase: εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων - "unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox." EN1096a2. Cael.306a12.

³⁰Cf. APo.72a14: "I call an immediate basic truth of a syllogism a thesis when, though it is not susceptible of proof by the teacher, yet ignorance of it does not constitute a total bar to progress on the part of the pupil; one which the pupil must know if he is to learn anything whatever is an axiom. I call it an axiom because there are such truths, and we give them the name of axioms *par excellencia* (ἔστι γὰρ ἕνια τοιαῦτα· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰώθαμεν ὄνομα λέγειν). Cf. Rolfes on APo.72a15: "Ein Axiom waere demnach etwa der Satz des Widerspruchs: Nichts kann zugleich sein und nicht sein; eine Thesis ein sogenanntes analytisches Ur-

only seems to be and is not a friend, and of the enemy the same may be said(περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ ἢ αὐτῇ θέσει)".³¹ For the verb τιθέναι in this sense cf. Pl.Tht.191C: "But did we not reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things we know?—Certainly we did.—Let us then not make that assumption(μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθώμεν), but another etc."³² For the verb in a similar but non-technical use in other writers cf. e.g. Soph.Ant.1166: οὐ τίθημι ἐγὼ ζῆν τοῦτον. Dem.24,43: τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ νῦν ὄντων ὑμῶν, οὐδὲν εἶναι τοιοῦτον τίθεμαι. 38,85: "Those who revealed him who was already a fugitive (for I assume this to be so — ἤσω γὰρ οὕτως) they have cast out of the alliance."

ὑπόθεσις is an unproved assertion that has been accepted by disputants as a basis for the argument. It affirms the existence of something rather than defining its nature, and it therefore takes the form of one member of a pair of contradictories which has not been definitely proved, which has not, like an axiom, been accepted as of necessity true, and whose contradictory has also not been disproved. The distinction from θέσις and ἀξίωμα is made APo. 72a18, where the word is also distinguished from ὁρισμός: θέσεως δ' ἢ μὲν ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων τῆς υποθέσεως λαμβάνουσα, οἷον λέγω τὸ εἶναι τι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι, ὑπόθεσις, ἢ δ' ἄνευ τούτου ὁρισμός. ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμός θέσις μὲν ἐστὶ· τίθεται γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς μονάδα τὸ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ποσόν· ὑπόθεσις δ' οὐκ ἐστίν; τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστὶ μονὰς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταύτόν. A. also uses the word in a wider sense, almost as a synonym for πρότασις: cf. Metaph. 1013a14: ὅθεν γνωστὸν τὸ πρῶτον πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρχὴ λέγεται τοῦ πρῶτου, οἷον τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑποθέσεις.³⁴ The background for A.'s use in Plato may be found in such passages as the following:³⁵ Phd.100A (both τιθέναι and ὑποτιθέναι): "I assume in each

teil, dessen Praedikat logisch aus dem Begriff des Subjekts folgt, wie der Satz: Die gerade Linie ist der kuerzeste Weg zwischen zwei Punkten"

³¹Cf. also Lg.889E: "Politics too, as they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in like manner all legislation which is based on untrue assumptions (ἥς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς θέσεις) is not due to nature but to art."

³²Cf. also Rep.430B: "And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be (καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι) courage."

³³Cf. also APo.50a16: "Further we must not try to reduce hypothetical syllogisms (τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμούς), for without the

case (ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον) some principle which I consider strongest, and whatsoever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true (τίθημι ὡς ἀληθὴ ὄντα), and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue." 92D: ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέχασθαι εἴρηται.³⁶ For examples outside of Plato cf. Hipp.Vet. Med.12: ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ζητεῖν: "to start from a supposition or assumption;" 8: ὑπόθεσιν ὑποτίθεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ. The general non-technical use that seems nearest to A's use is "to lay down a foundation for something". Cf. e.g. Dem.III.2: "Now I am persuaded that we must be content to secure the first, that of saving our allies. If once we can be sure of that, we can go on to consider who is to be punished and how it is to be done, but until that foundation is well and truly laid (πρὶν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ὑποέσθαι), it is idle to say a word about our ultimate object" (Kennedy's transl.).³⁷

given premisses it is not possible to reduce them. For they have not been proved by syllogism but assented to by agreement." and 40b25: "It is necessary that every demonstration and every syllogism should prove either that something belongs or that it does not, and this either universally or in part, and further either ostensibly or hypothetically (ἢ δεικτικῶς ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως)."

³⁴Cf. also APo.81b14: φανερόν οὖν ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ καὶ οἱ λεγόμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐταὶ εἰσιν - here ὑπ. is used as synonym for ἀρχή: "It is clear then that these (three terms) are fundamentals and the so-called hypotheses of syllogisms."

³⁵Cf. Professor Shorey in A.J.P.10,4: "The dialectician (in Plato) is not held to any particular set of ἀρχαί...he is willing to push the argument back until some common ground is reached. The propositions thus found acceptable to both disputants, be it a definition, an axiom, or a wide generalization in some special field, become a ὑπόθεσις or an ἀρχή, which must be allowed unconditional validity, while the consequences that flow from it are being examined."

³⁶Cf. also Phd.94B: ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; - Men.86E: εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἄλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδασκτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν· λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὥδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδὴν τις εἴρηται αὐτοῦς.

³⁷Cf. also X.Cyr.5.5.13: "I am ready to make you a proposal (ὑπό-

What ὁρισμός (distinguished from ὑπόθεσις supra) is we can see from Metaph.1029b19: ἐν ᾧ ἄρα μὴ ἐνέσται λόγῳ αὐτό, λέγοντι αὐτό, οὗτος ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστω - "a declaration in which the object to be defined is not included (by name), yet the declaration designates it (according to essence), - this is the declaration of the essence (or the definition) of each thing." The constituent parts of a definition are stated Top.103b15: ὁ ὁρισμός ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν: "the definition consists of genus and differentiae." The verb ὀρίζεσθαι is used in a wider sense, as APo.92b26 shows: "Since, therefore, to define is to prove either a thing's essential nature or the meaning of its name, we may conclude that definition, if it in no sense proves essential nature, is a set of words signifying precisely what a name signifies (ὁ ὀριζόμενος δείκνυσιν ἢ τί ἐστὶ ἢ τί σημαίνει τοῦνομα)." ³⁸ The noun ὁρισμός appears first with A. Herodotus (e.g. 2,17) and Euripides (Hec.16: ὁρ. βαρβάρων - "against the barbarians) have ὁρισμός in the sense of "boundary", "limit". The verb in the sense of "to define" may be illustrated by Pl.Rep.505C: τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὀριζόμενοι; Sph.246A: ταῦτόν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι. Grg.475A: "...and this time...your definition is quite fair when you define what is fair by pleasure and good (καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζῃ...ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν)." ³⁹

The word ὅρος is frequently used by A. as a virtual synonym of ὁρισμός. Cf. e.g. Top.153a11 ff.: ...ἅλλης ἐστὶ πραγματείας ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὅρος καὶ πῶς ὀρίζεσθαι δεῖ...μόνον λεκτέον ὅτι δυνατόν γενέσθαι ὁρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι συλλογισμόν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὅρος λόγος ὃ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ πράγματι δηλῶν...ὃ ταῦτα ἔχων λόγος ὅρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἕτερον εἶναι ὅρον, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορεῖται.

θεσις) the fairest that can be made between friends." Dem.21,108: περὶ πάντων ὧν ἂν ἀκούητε, τοῦθ' ὑποθέντες ἀκούετε τῇ γνώμῃ, τί ἂν, εἰ τις ἐπασχε ταῦθ' ὑμῶν, ἐποίει, καὶ τίν' ἂν εἶχεν ὀργὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν ποιοῦντα.

³⁸ ὀρίζεσθαι as τί σημαίνει τοῦνομα is called APo.93b31 λόγος ὀνοματῶδης. Later Peripatetics called the τί ἐστὶ type ὅρος πραγματώδης (realis) or ὅρος οὐσιώδης (essentialis). Cf. Kappes, Ar. Lexicon, p.41.

³⁹ Cf. also Tht.109E: "And so anyone who sets out to define (εἰ τις ὀρίζειται) false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense." X.Mem.4.6.6.: "At last then we may rightly define just men as those who know best what is just concerning men." διορισμός

Cf. also Metaph.1038a29. But the more common technical use is in the sense of terminus, limit: e.g. subject and predicate are the limits of a sentence - the outer boundaries. Cf. APr.24b16: ὅρον δὲ καλῶ, εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται. ὅροι are also the essential marks that determine and limit a concept. ὅρος thus becomes identical with λόγος, - concept. In the scale of the concepts there is a πρῶτος, a μέσος, and an ἔσχατος ὅρος, the relation being that of species to genus (ἐν ὧν εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ - τῷ πρώτῳ), and in the syllogism the ὅροι are the three terms (πρῶτος or μεῖζων, μέσος, ἔσχατος or ἐλάττω). The use of the word by A. is highly technical. It⁴⁰ has a mathematical background (geometry, ratio and proportion). For similar uses in Plato cf. Rep.443D: ...ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενομένον αὐτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτέχνως, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης... Phlb.17D: "But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to high and low pitch and the limits of the intervals (τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων)". Rep.551A: οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὐ μὲν μάλλον ὀλιγαρχία, πλεον, οὐ δὲ ἥττον, ἔλαττον... Cf. also Dem.18,296: ...τῷ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν' εἶχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατρεποῦτες... Eur.L.T.1219: πέπλον ὀμμάτων προθέσθαι - "draw the mantle o'er thine eyes" ...τοῦδ' ὅρος τίς ἐστί μοι; - "what the limit set herein?".

is used by Plato Plt.282E: "Well, just define (διορίσαι) warp and woof, - perhaps the definition (διορισμός) would serve you well at this junction."

⁴⁰ Cf. Ross, Aristotle, p.33: "It is noteworthy that much of A's terminology in this part of his work (e.g. logic) has a mathematical air." Ross cites σχῆμα, διάστημα, ὅρος, ἄκρον, μέσον. τὰ ἄκρά are the major and minor terms of the syllogism, μέσον is the "middle term", over against which τὰ ἄκρά are the "extremes". The ἄκρά are μεῖζον or πρῶτον and ἐλάττω or ἔσχατον. Cf. APr.70b4 ff. 26a18. ἄκρός is used of the extreme of a line (in geometry) and of the extremes of a proportion; cf. Pl.Ti.36A. This mathematical use occurs also EN1133b2: "And when they (the farmer and the shoemaker) exchange their products, they must reduce them to the form of a proportion (εἰς σχῆμα δ'ἀναλογίας), otherwise one of the two extremes (τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον) will have both the excesses." Cf.

αἴτημα, "postulate", is distinguished from ἀξιῶμα APO.76 b21 ff.: "...that which expresses necessary self-grounded fact... is distinct from both the hypotheses of a science and from illegitimate postulate (οὐκ ἔστι δ' ὑπόθεσις οὐδ' αἴτημα, ὁ ἀνάγκη εἶναι δι' αὐτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη)...26: that which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof is, if the pupil believes and accepts it, hypothesis...; if the pupil has no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter, the same assumption is an illegitimate postulate. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and illegitimate postulate: The latter is contrary to the pupil's opinion, demonstrable, but assumed and used without demonstration." The difference lies in the opponent's attitude. If he accepts the proposition it may be ἀξιῶμα or ὑπόθεσις, - if he does not accept it or is averse to it, and the argument nevertheless proceeds, it is αἴτημα.⁴¹ Greek usage offers little to give a background for this highly technical usage. It may perhaps be connected with αἰτεῖν in the sense of asking or demanding what is not one's own, e.g. Lys.19,27: χαλκῶματα δὲ συμμῖκτα οὐ πολλὰ ἐκέκτητο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅθ' εἴστιν τοὺς παρ' Ἐυαγόρου πρεσβεύοντας, αἴτησάμενος ἐχρήσατο - "he had to use what he could get by asking".

One of the chief meanings of ἀρχή with A. is "starting point for reasoning". The word thus becomes virtually a synonym of πρότασις (e.g. APr.46a10: αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν καθόλου μὲν εἰρηνται. APO.88b4: ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἐλάττους τῶν συμπερασμάτων· ἀρχαὶ μὲν γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις...ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, αἱ δ' ἐνδεχόμενοι...). This technical use of ἀρχή is not found before A. What may be considered a similar use is found Dem.2,10: ὡς περ γὰρ οἰκίας, οἶμαι, καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ κάτωθεν ἰσχυρότατ' εἶναι δεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀληθεῖς καὶ δικαίας εἶναι προσήκει.

From the ἀρχή in general A. distinguishes the ἀρχὴ ἀμέσος. Cf. APO.72a7: ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἀμέσος, ἀμέσος δ' ἡς μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλη προτέρη. The meaning of ἀμέσος involves the technical meaning of μέσος, q.v. supra. The word does not occur before A.

Rackham's note. For a definition of μέσον cf. APr.25b35. The use of this term begins with A.

⁴¹ Cf. also APr.64b28: τὸ δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν, ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύειν τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δ' ἐπισυμβαίνει πολλαχῶς...ὅταν τὸ μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν δι' αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχείρησις δεικνύται, τότε αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς... - "whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself, then he

A particular type of πρότασις is called ἐνδοξον. A. says Top.100a30: "Dialectical reasoning reasons from ἐνδοξα." These are defined Top.100a21: "Those opinions are 'generally accepted' (ἐνδοξα) which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them." Top.100b21 ἐνδοξα are opposed to τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀληθῆ. The word is used by A. in a variety of combinations: With πρότασις, ἐρώτησις, ἐπαγωγή, and ἀξίωμα, as the opposite of ἔδοξος and παρὰδοξος, and as a synonym of φαίνόμενον, γνώριμον, πίθανον, πιστόν. Cf. Rh.1355a17, where A. distinguishes πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα from πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. The special meaning here given the word does not appear before A. In Greek speech before A. the usual meaning is "held in high repute." For this meaning cf. also EN1098b28: ἄλλιοι καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες. In general the word is applied chiefly to living beings. Cf. Pl.Sph.223B: νέοι πλούσιοι καὶ ἐνδοξοί...Isoc.1,37: μὴ πλουσιώτερος ἄλλ' ἐνδοξότερος. Also Aeschin.3,231: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πατέρες ὑμῶν τὰ μὲν ἐνδοξα καὶ λαμπρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνέτιθεσαν τῷ δήμῳ, τὰ δὲ τάπεινα καὶ καταδεέστερα εἰς τοὺς ρήτορας τοὺς φαύλους ἔτρεπον.

Top.100a25 ff. A. distinguishes the following terms that are used with relation to the process of reasoning: συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις, διαλεκτικός, ἐριστικός. Συλλογισμός is defined as follows: "Now reasoning (συλλογισμός) is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these naturally results." Cf. also APr.24b18: "A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so."⁴² The word is current before A. in Greek speech in various meanings: "to sum up": cf. Dem.19,177: "I wish to recapitulate the charges (συλλογίσασθαι δὴ βούλομαι); Pl.Grg.479E: "But if what we have agreed is true, Polus, do you observe the consequences of our argument? Or, if you like, shall we reckon them up together?(ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;)" "to take into account": EN1101a34: "We ought to take this difference into account (συλλογιστέον)", i.e. whether a calamity happens during -----
begs the original question"). Cf. also APr.41b8 and the detailed discussion Top.162b31.

⁴² A. says of the doctrine of the syllogism SE184b1: "On the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning (συλλογισμός) we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches." For A.'s relation to Plato with

one's life or when one is dead; it is used of the process of reasoning, but not in A.'s sense, Pl.Tht.186D: "Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them (ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ)"; and, generally, "to make an inference or draw a conclusion", Po.1448b16: χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκονας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τι ἕκαστον. Cf. also Rh.1371b10. Pl.Rep.516B: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων κτλ. 365A: "...young men...flitting...from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them (συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν) as to the character and path whereby a man would lead the best life." Dem.18,172: "The man who from first to last had closely watched the sequence of events, and had rightly fathomed (συλλαλογισμένον ὁρθῶς) the purposes and designs of Philip." Cra.412A: "σύνεσις in its turn is a kind of reckoning together (δόξεις ἂν ὥσπερ συλλογισμὸς εἶναι)." ⁴⁵

ἀπόδειξις is demonstration or proof from true and necessary premisses. Cf. Top.100a27: "Reasoning (συλλογισμός) is demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true;" APo.71b18: "By demonstration I mean a syllogism, productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, betterknown and primary to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect

regard to the doctrine of the syllogism cf. Shorey, "The Origin of the Syllogism," C.F.19 (1924), p.1-19.

⁴³ συμπεράσμα, "conclusion" is distinguished from συλλογισμός, the reasoning process itself, APr.42b1: "If, then, syllogisms are taken with respect to their main premisses, every syllogism will consist of a even number of premisses and an odd number of terms (for the terms exceed the premisses by one), and the conclusions will be half the number of the premisses." Cf. also APr.5/a39; Top.168a21: δεῖ ἐκ τῶν καίμενων συμβαίνειν τὸ συμπεράσμα... The word usually signifies not only the formal element in the concluding proposition which brings together the πέρατα (APr.66a38: οἶον εἴπω δέον συμπεραίνεσθαι τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Ζ κτλ.) but is used to express also the substantive truth that results from the reasoning process (cf. APr.57a39: συμπεράσμα ἀληθές. APo.93a8: συμπεράσμα τῆς ἀποδείξεως). The

to cause. Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate (οἰκεῖται) to the conclusion. Syllogisms there may indeed be without these conditions, but such syllogisms, not being productive of scientific knowledge, will not be demonstration." Greek usage has this word in the sense of sound demonstration, reliable proof and argument, as well as in the more general sense of any argument or proof. For the former meaning cf. Pl.Tht.162E: "You do not advance any cogent proof (ἀπόδειξιν καὶ ἀνάγκην) whatsoever; you base your statements on probability (τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθαι)." Dem.18,300: "The generals and the forces of the allies were beaten by (Philip's) good fortune. Have I any proof of my claim (ἀποδείξεις)? Yes, proofs definite and manifest (ἐναργεῖς καὶ φανεραὶ)." Isoc.10,3: "...Μέλισσον, ὃς ἀπείρων τὸ πλῆθος πεφυκότων τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντός ἐπεχείρησεν ἀποδείξεις εὐρίσκειν. Pl.Phd.73A: "But...what were the proofs of this? (ποιὰ τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις)" - i.e. that the soul existed somewhere before being born in human form. Phd.92D has both senses: "This other came to me without demonstration, it merely seemed probable and attractive (ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς εὐπρεπείας), which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability (τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιούμενοις) are deceptive ... But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument." For the wider sense cf. Thuc.2,13: "And Pericles used still other arguments...to prove that they would be victorious in war (εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περὶέσεσθαι)." Hdt.8,101: Πέρσαι τε καὶ ὁ πεζὸς στρατὸς οὐδενὸς μεταίτιοι πάθος εἰσι, ἀλλὰ βουλομένοισιν σφί γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπόδειξις ("and of this he declares they would very gladly give me proof"). Lys.12,19: "Yet to what extremes of insatiable greed for gain did they go in this revelation that they made of their own character (καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τοῦ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξιν ἐποίησαντο)."

διαλεκτικός, as distinguished from ἀποδεικτικός, is used by A. to designate a method of demonstration which does not begin with premisses that are immediately sure or proved to be true, but takes its premisses from what is generally accepted, - the ἐνδοξα

noun does not occur before A. For the verb the following meanings occur: "to decide or conclude absolutely", "to be finished". Cf. Eur.Med.341: μῖχιν με μῆναι τήνδ' ἔασον ἡμέραν καὶ ξυμπερᾶναι φρόντισδ' ἢ φευξόμεθα. Pl.Tim.39D: "The complete number of time fulfils the complete year when all the eight circuits with their relative speed finish together (ξυμπερανθέντα) and come to a head." Xen.

which are defined Top.100a18 as opinions "which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, etc." as distinct from "things true and primary (ἀληθῆ καὶ πρῶτα)", which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves; e.g. the first principles of science.⁴⁴ In his definitions A. has narrowed the word down to one particular type of argumentation. Plato has a wider use: a method of inquiry in question and answer form, - cf. Cra.390C: "...and the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call adialectician (ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;)" Rep.534B. -- which grows out of the popular meaning of discourse, conversation; cf. X.Mem.4.5.12: "And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion (διαλέγεσθαι δυνατότατους)." The very name "discussion" (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) according to him is derived from the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting, discussing things after their kind (ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντος κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα). Pl.Tht.146A: "I hope...I am not rude, through my love of discussion (ὕπὸ φιλολογίας) and my eagerness to make us converse (ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι) and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another." In a more elevated sense it is used by Plato of philosophic method in general; cf. Rep.534E: ...ἔρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοι τ' ἔσονται...ὥσπερ θρίγκος τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ διαλεκτικῇ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι. Sph.253E: "But you surely...will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness (τῷ καθάρως τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι)." ⁴⁵

Cyr.6.1.30: "Thus these plans were being put into execution (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω συνεπεραίνετο)."

⁴⁴Cf. Top.100a22: "A πρότασις διαλεκτικῇ is a proposition in accord with general opinion, which has no absolute certainty, but a more or less great probability." APr.24a22: "The demonstrative (ἀποδεικτικῇ) premiss differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements, whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary's choice between two contradictions." Top.105b31: "For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion (διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν)." Sometimes the word has the additional suggestion of "sophistical"; cf. DeAn.403a2: "Hence the definitions which lead to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even conjecture (μηδ' εἰκάσαι ...εὐμαρές) respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and are void of content, one and all."

Top.100b23 A. distinguishes ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμὸς, "eristical reasoning", from ἀποδειξίς and διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμὸς, defining it as follows: "Reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such, or again, if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted... So then of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called reasoning as well, but the other should be called 'contentious reasoning' but not 'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but does not really do so."⁴⁶ Cf. also Top.161a25: "He, however, who would rightly convert anyone to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner, just as a geometrioian should reason geometrically, whether his conclusion be false or true...;" SE171b35: ὁ δ' ἐριστικὸς ἐστὶ πως οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν ὥς ὁ ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικόν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ παραλογίζεται καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος τὸν γεωμέτρην. 182b32. The word ἐριστικὸς is not found before Plato. Plato has the contrast between διαλέγεσθαι and ἐρίζειν Rep.454A: ...δοκοῦσι μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλεκτῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Cf. also Prt.337B: "For friends dispute with friends (ἀμφισβητοῦσι) just from good feeling; whereas wrangling (ἐρίζουσι) is between those who are at variance and enmity with one another."⁴⁷ Here the word takes on the meaning of "wrangling", which is found also Ly.211B: "But be ready to come to my support, in case Menexenus attempts to refute me (ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχείρη);⁴⁸ you know what a keen disputant he is (οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικὸς ἐστίν). ἐρίζειν is also used in the general sense of

⁴⁵ The originator of the method is said to have been Zeno; cf. A.Fr. 1484b30 (D.L.9, 25) about Zeno: φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ σοφιστῇ εὐρέτην αὐτὸν γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς.

⁴⁶ ἐριστικὸς δ' ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος... ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος τῶν ρηθέντων ἐριστικῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ συλλογισμὸς λεγέσθω, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ἐριστικὸς μὲν συλλογισμὸς, συλλογισμὸς δ' οὐ, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται μὲν συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλογίζεται δ' οὐ.

⁴⁷ A distinction of Prodicus. cf. Mayer, Prodikos von Keos, p.26.

⁴⁸ Cf. also Isoc.2,39: σοφοὺς νμίζε μὴ τοὺς ἀκριβῶς περὶ μικρῶν ἐρίζοντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὐ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων λέγοντας. "Isocrates maliciously confounds eristic with dialectics, while Plato is careful

"to argue"; cf. Dem.9,113: "...most people here at Athens contended (ἤριζον) that Philip's passage through Thermopylae would be anything but a gain to the Thebans." The sophistical art is called ἐριστική τέχνη, Pl.Sph.231E: "He was an athlete in a contest of words (ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους) who had taken for his own the art of disputation (τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην)."⁴⁹ The word is also used in a better and more general sense Sph.225C: "But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy (ἀμφισβητοῦν) about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation (ἐριστικὸν), are we not?"

ἐπαγωγή, "induction", is distinguished from ἀπόδειξις APo. 81a40: ἐστὶ δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγή ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. Cf. also Top.105a13 for the distinction from συλλογισμός. "There is on the one hand Induction (ἐπαγωγή), on the other Reasoning (συλλογισμός). Now what reasoning is has been said before (100a25); induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear; it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though Reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictory people."⁵⁰ ἐπαγωγή is technical in A. and rare in general Greek usage. Thucydides has it in the sense of "a bringing on"; cf. 5,28: ὅπως...ἐπαγωγῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀφείλη ("that he might have ...the advantage of importing supplies by sea"); also 7,24. For a Platonic use as a possible background for A.'s use cf. Plt.278A: "Would not the easiest and best way to lead them to the letters which they do not yet know be this (ἐπάγειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ μήπως γινωσκόμενα)?" For the general use of the verb in contexts referring to argument and persuasion cf. e.g. Thuc.1,107: "To this ----- to distinguish them." -- Shorey on Rep.454A, Loeb.

⁴⁹ Cf. also Diog.L.9,55, where τέχνη ἐριστικῶν is mentioned as a work of the sophist Protagoras.

⁵⁰ Cf. also Top.108b11: "It (the examination of likenesses) is useful for inductive arguments, because it is by means of an induction of individual cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence; for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness." 156a4: "Induction should proceed from individual cases to the universal and from the known to the unknown; and the objects of perception are better known, to most people, if not invariably."

course they were partly influenced by some Athenians (τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων κρύφα); Isoc. 14, 63: πολλῶν δ' ἐν-
όντων εἶπεῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὕμῃς ἐπαγάγοι μᾶλλον φροντίσαι τῆς ἡμε-
τέρας σωτηρίας, οὐ δύναμαι πάντα περιλαβεῖν. Dem. 5, 10: "Led on by
these false hopes and cajoleries you abandoned the Phocians against
your own interests (τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φανακισμοὺς, οἷς ἐπαχθέν-
τες κτλ.).

παράδειγμα as referring to the reasoning process, "reason-
ing from analogy", is distinguished from ἐπαγωγή Rh. 1357b 25 ff.:
"We have said that example is a kind of induction and with what
kind of material it deals by way of induction. It is neither the
relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole
to another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both
come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the
other."⁵¹ For the use of παράδειγμα as "proof by example" outside
of A. cf. Thuc. 1, 2: "And here is an excellent illustration (καὶ πα-
ράδειγμα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου) of the truth of my statement that it was
owing to these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did not
increase in the same way as Attica; for the most influential men
...driven out of their own countries...resorted to Athens." The
general meaning of "example" may be illustrated by Pl. Lg. 976E:
"...we stated an outline and typical cases of punishments, and gave
the judges examples (παράδειγματα), so as to prevent their over-
stepping the bounds of justice." The most common meaning is "warn-
ing example"; cf. e.g. Thuc. 5, 10: "We could no longer regard the
Athenians as trustworthy leaders, taking as warning examples the

⁵¹ Cf. also Rh. 1356b 6: καλῶ δ' ἐνθύμημα μὲν ρητορικὴν συλλογισμὸν,
παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ρητορικὴν. APr. 68b 37 ff.: "We have an exam-
ple (παράδειγμα) when the major term is proved to belong to the mid-
dle by means of a term which resembles the third. It ought to be
known both that the middle belongs to the third term, and that the
first belongs to that which resembles the third. For example let
A be an evil, B making war against neighbors, C Athenians against
Thebans, D Thebans against Phocians. If then we wish to prove that
to fight with the Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight
against neighbors is an evil. Evidence of this is obtained from
similar cases, e.g. that the war against the Phocians was an evil
to the Thebans. Since then to fight against neighbors is an evil,
and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbors, it
is clear that to fight against Thebans is an evil...It (παράδειγμα)
differs from induction (ἐπαγωγή), because induction starting from
all the particular cases proves...that the major term belongs to

events of the past (παράδειγμασι τοῖς προγεγενημένοις χρώμενοι). " Lys.25,23: "You ought therefore to take the events of the past as your example in resolving on the future course of things (τοῖς πρότερον γεγεννημένοις παρδείγμασι χρωμένοις)." Dem.19,105: "... make him a living example to other malefactors." Lycurg.9: ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ὑμετέραν κρίσιν καταλείπεσθαι παράδειγμα τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις.⁵²

The word ἐνθύμημα is used by A. to designate a rhetorical syllogism that is drawn from probable premisses and therefore is not strictly a demonstrative proof. The distinction from παράδειγμα is brought out Rh.1356b6: "Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism (ἐνθύμημα μὲν ρητορικὴν συλλογισμόν), and an example rhetorical induction." b18: "...proof from a number of particular cases...is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally, or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme."⁵³ In general Greek usage ἐνθύμημα is apiece of reasoning or argument.

the middle, and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term, whereas argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases."

⁵² Rh.1393a29 A. makes some distinctions with regard to various kinds of παραδείγματα: "There are two kinds of examples; namely one which consists of relating things that have happened(παράγματα προγεγενημένα), and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons (παραβολαί) or fables, such as those of Aesop and the Libyan." παραβολή is thus used as a technical rhetorical term for "comparison", the invention and application of cases that can easily be supposed and occur in real life, as distinguished from fables, which are pure fiction, and history. The word is also used by A. in the sense of a "placing beside", "comparing", etc. Cf. Top.104a28: ἐνδοξον δ' ἐν παραβολῇ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου· οἷον εἰ τοὺς φίλους δεῖ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δεῖ κακῶς... The word is rare before A. The last mentioned use of A. may be illustrated by Pl.Ph1b.33B: ἐρρήθη γὰρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων..., and the rhetorical use by Isoc.12,227: εἰ δέ τις δοκᾷ τὴν παραβολὴν ἀπρεπῆ πεποιτῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων δόξαν, i.e. the Spartans as an "illustration of a certain kind of concord" - 226: "...being of one mind among themselves regarding the outside world, they have always striven to set the

The word has a rhetorical coloring in Soph.O.C.292, where after a long speech by Oedipus the Chorus says: "The plea thou urgest needs must give us pause, set forth in weighty argument (ταρβεῖν μὲν, ὦ γέραιε, τάνθυμματα), but we must leave the issue with the ruling powers." Isoc.9,10: τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἕξεται τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἀλλ' ἀποτόμως καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς μόνον καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαζόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι. Aeschin.2,110: "To the account he added a conclusion (ἐνθύμημα) like this: That he had been the first to put a curb on those who were trying to block the peace etc." The aspect of "an act of reasoning" is apparent in Dem.21,54: εἰσὶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αὗται καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ μαντεῖαι τῇ πόλει κάγαθαί. τί οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ; Other numerous passages bring out the element of "pondering", "reflecting", cf. e.g. Thuc.2,40: ...καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδραχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ᾧ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Dem.1,21: "It is worthwhile to observe (ἐνθυμεῖσθαι) and consider (λογίσασθαι) how Philip stands today."

ἀπαγωγή, "reduction", is bringing a problem back to another which is easier to solve, a shifting of the argument whereby it is based on probable or agreed assumptions and the original problem is solved indirectly. A. discusses the word (immediately

Hellenes at variance with each other, reducing this practice, as it were, to a fine art." Strictly speaking, this illustration would fall rather under A.'s first class of παραδείγματα; neither example strictly speaking fits the definition of A. - λόγος as used here may be illustrated by Hdt.1,141 and Pl.Phd.60, both of which passages speak of the "fables" of Aesop.

⁵³Cf. also Rh.1355a8; Apr.70a10: "Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs (ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων); Rh. 1394a27: "...as the enthymeme is, we may say, the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims (a maxim, - γνώμη - is a statement...concerning...the objects of human actions and what should be done or avoided with reference to them) are the premisses or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example: 'No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever' is a maxim, but when the why and the wherefore are added the whole makes an enthymeme etc." - For this use of γνώμη, "practical maxim", outside of A. cf. e.g. Heracl.78(Diels): ἡθεὸς γὰρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῶν δ' ἔχει. Soph.Aj.1091: "Sage precepts these, my

after *κράδεια*) as follows, APr.69a20: "By reduction (*ἀπαγωγή*) we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle, but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than the conclusion, or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. For in these cases it turns out that we approach more nearly to knowledge etc." The word applies particularly to the *reductio ad impossibile*; cf. APr.28b16: *ἔστι δ' ἀποδείξιαι καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου καὶ τῇ ἐκθέσει* - then follows an example of *reductio ad impossibile* - then: *δεικνύναι δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς κτλ.* Cf. also 40b25. The word (noun and verb) is not used in a logical sense before A. For a use of the verb that appears to supply a background for A.'s technical usage in the sense of "to lead away", "divert", "lead astray", especially by sophistry or trickery cf. Pl.Phdr.262B: "Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances (*διὰ τῶν ὁμοιωμάτων...ἀπάγων*) or of avoiding such deception himself?" Dem.19,242: "Demosthenes will conduct this man's defence, and will denounce my conduct of the embassy; and then, if he leads you astray (*ἄν...ἀπαγάγη τῷ λόγῳ*), he will...boast etc." Thuc.2,59 (in a somewhat different sense): "When he saw that they were exasperated...wishing to reassure them, and by ridding their minds of resentment (*ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης*) to bring them to a...milder mood." Cf. also 2,65: "...to divert their minds (*ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην*) from their present ills."

ἐνστάσις is "an objection directed not against an opponent's conclusion, but to the proposition advanced by him. This being universal if his conclusion is to be universal, the objection may be universal or particular. The establishment of the denial of one particular is sufficient to destroy the universal."⁵⁴ This meaning of the word occurs first with A. In Aeschin.2,20 the word refers to the institution of legal proceedings: "The whole affair, therefore, from the beginning originated not with me (*ἡ...ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνστάσις τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων ἐγένετο οὐ δι' ἐμοῦ*)."

lord (*μὴ γνώμας ὑποστήσας σοφάς*). X.Mem.4.2.9.: "The thoughts of the wise (*τὰς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας*) enrich their possessors with virtue.

⁵⁴Cf. J.H.Freese, Transl. of A.'s Rhetoric, Loeb, p.476. APr.69a37: "If the objection is particular, the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the sub-

the use of the verb in connection with argument of. Pl.Phil.77B: "Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved (οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ...ἀποδεσδεῖσθαι), but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed... still remains (ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν...τὸ τῶν πολλῶν...ὅπως μὴ διασπαρνῆται κτλ.). In a 5th century inscription (SIG 45,28) the opponent in a lawsuit is called ο ευσστηκός, and Polybius (6.16.4) uses the word of the veto power of the Roman tribunes.

Apr.70a7 A. distinguishes εἰκός and σημείον: "A probability (εἰκός) and a sign (σημείον) are not identical, but a probability is a generally approved proposition; what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability; e.g. 'the envious hate', 'the beloved show affection'." ⁵⁵ A.'s usage is in agreement with common Greek usage. Cf. Pl.Tht.162B: "You say that the sort of thing that the crowd would really accept - that it is a terrible thing if every man is no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever (ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν λέγεις); you base your statements on probability (ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθαι) etc."; in a more general sense Thuc.6,18: "On what reasonable plea, then, can we hold back ourselves (τί ἂν λέγοντας εἰκός ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκοιμῆμεν) or make excuse to our allies there for refusing to aid them?" 4,17: "And yet those who have most often undergone a change of fortune for better or for worse have best reason to be distrustful of prosperity (δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀπιστέτατοι εἶναι ταῖς σύπραγμασις); and this would naturally hold true of both your state and ours in an exceptional degree, in view of our past experience (δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστα' ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος προσείη). 1,121: "And for many reasons we are likely to prevail (κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκός ἐπικρατῆσαι); first, because we are superior in point of numbers, etc." 2,89. Soph.O.T.74: "'Tis strange, this endless tarrying..." (τοῦ γὰρ εἰκότος πέρα ἄκροτι πλείω τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου). Hdt.1,155: τὰ οἰκότα - "that which is reasonable."

ject of his opponent's premiss is universal, etc." Top.157a35. Rh.1402a31: "An objection is brought...in four ways: It may be derived from itself, or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided." Examples are then given.

⁵⁵ Cf. also Rh.1357a34: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἅπλως δὲ, καθάπερ ὀρίζονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ

σημεῖον is defined APr.70a7: "A 'sign' means a demonstrative proposition necessary (πρότασις ἀποδεικτική) or generally approved (ἐνδοξος); for anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other's being or having come into being," and 70b1 it is distinguished from τεκμήριον as follows: "We must either divide signs (σημεῖα) in the way stated, and among them designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the index (τεκμήριον) which makes us know, and the middle term above all has this character), or else we must call the arguments derived from the extremes signs, that derived from the middle term the index..." The same terms are distinguished Rh.1357b2: "... As to signs (σημεῖα) some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called τεκμήρια (τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν τεκμήριον); those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name."⁵⁶ The meanings that emerge from these definitions are: For σημεῖον, 1. in the wider sense any proof, demonstrative or dialectical, that leads to a conclusion in a rhetorical syllogism; 2. in the narrower sense, a dialectical proof that leads only to a probable and therefore fallible conclusion; for τεκμήριον, the proof that leads to a necessary and certain conclusion. τεκμήριον is thus included in σημεῖον in the wider sense.⁵⁷ The distinction is not generally observed. The Attic orators frequently use the words interchangeably; cf. e.g. Isoc.1,2: ἀπετάλκασι τόνδε τὸν λόγον τεκμήριον μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἡμῶς εὐνοίας, σημεῖον δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἱππόνικον

ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐμεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰχός, ὥς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος.

⁵⁶ For τεκμήριον cf. also Rh.1357b10: "I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called τεκμήριον; for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a τεκμήριον, something as it were proved (δεδειγμένον) and concluded (πεπρασμένον); for in the old language τέκμαρ and κέρως have the same meaning." The distinction appears also Rh.1.1430b34, but with meanings different from those here given by A.

⁵⁷ Rh.1357b12 ff. A. gives the following examples: In the statements "all wise men are just because Socrates was both wise and just" and "This man has a fever because he breathes hard" we are dealing with σημεῖα, whereas the proof in "A man is ill because he has a fever" and "A woman has a child because she has milk" is a τεκμήριον, since the "sign" mentioned "is the invariable accompaniment

συνηθείας. 1,13: ἐκείνο μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων εὐπορίας σημεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς τῶν τρόπων καλοκαγαθείας τεκμήριον. 4,101: ἐγὼ μὲν ἡγοῦμαι πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι τοῦτο σημεῖον, ὡς κακῶς ἤρχομεν, εἴ τινες τῶν πολεμησάντων ἡμῖν σφόδρα φαίνονται κολασθέντες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸδε μεῖζον τεκμήριον, ὡς καλῶς διωκοῦμεν τὰ τῶν συμμάχων, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων τῶν ὑπ' ἡμῖν οὐσῶν οὐδεμία ταύταις ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιέπεσεν. Lys. 4,12: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐτε πρόνοια ἐγένετο οὐτε ἀδικῶ τοῦτον...ἐκ τοσούτων τεκμηρίων καὶ μαρτυρίων ὑμῖν ἐπιδέδεται· ἀξιῶ δ' ὅσον ἂν ἐγένετο σημεῖον τοῦτω πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν φυγόντος ἐμοῦ τὴν βάσανον, τοσοῦτον ἐμοὶ τεκμήριον γενέσθαι ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι κτλ. Cf. also Pl.Grg. 520E: καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὐ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργησίαν ἀντ' εὐ πείσεται with Grg. 487B: "You have had a sound education...and you are well disposed to me. You ask what proof I have(τεκμήριον)?...I hear you giving me the same advice as you gave your most intimate friends." σημεῖον is the wider term (cf. e.g. Soph. O.T. 1095: οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦθ' ὅπως ἐγὼ λαβὼν σημεῖα τοιαῦτ' οὐ φανῶ τοῦμόν... Ar.Nu. 369: μεγάλοις δὲ σ' ἐγὼ σημεῖοις αὐτὸ διδάξω - "that clouds cause rain". Thuc. 1,6: πᾶσα Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφῶρει...σημεῖον δ' ἔστι ταῦτα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτι οὕτω νεμόμενα. Isoc. 4,87: σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ τάχους καὶ τῆς ἀμείλλης...τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πυθέσθαι...καὶ βοηθήσαντας. And. La. Pax 25: ὥσπερ δὲ τῆς τότε ἀμαρτίας τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων σημεῖα ἔφατε χρῆναι πιστότατα ποιούμενα κακὸν μὲν ἄνδρα ἡγεῖσθαι); but τεκμήριον is not used in the restricted sense assigned to it by A., but often designates a more positive kind of proof than σημεῖον. Cf. Isae. 4,12: ἐν μόνασι δὲ ταῖς τῶν κληρῶν εἰσαγωγαῖς δοκεῖ μοι προσήκειν τεκμηρίοις μᾶλλον ἢ μάρτυσι πιστεύειν. 8,6: τὰ μὲν πάλοι γεγενημένα λόγων ἀκοῇ καὶ μαρτύρων, τὰ δ' ὥστε καὶ μνημονεύεσθαι, τοῖς εἰδόσι χρώμενος μάρτυσι, ἔτι δὲ τεκμηρίοις ἃ κρείττω τῶν μαρτυρίων ἐστίν. Antipho Tetr. A810: τὰ δὲ εἰκότα ἅλλα πρὸς ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἀποδεικτικὰ ὄντα...τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια ἐμὰ, οὐ τούτων ὄντα ἐδήλωσα· τά τε ἴχνη τοῦ φόνου οὐκ εἰς ἐμὲ φέροντα, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς ἀπολυομένους ἀποδέδεται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Dem. 29,40. τεκμήριον δὲ καὶ πίστις ἐστίν, οὐκ εἴ τις τι μὴ οἶδε τοῦτον ἔχοντα (πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴεν), ἀλλ' εἴ τις οἶδεν.

In connection with the various designations for argumentative proof discussed above A. uses the word πίστις as a broad general term for rhetorical proof; ⁵⁸ cf. e.g. Rh. 1414a35: τούτων τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις. 1356b6: "Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs (πίστεις ποιοῦνται) either examples or en-

of the fact to which it bears witness" (Cope).

thymemes, and nothing else." 1358a1: "We have now stated the materials for proofs which are thought to be demonstrative (πίστις ἀποδεικτική), i.e. ἐνθυμημα, παραδείγμα. 1354a13: "Proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art (αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἐντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον...ἐνθυμήματα...ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως)." For the background of this use in general Greek usage cf. e.g. Pl. Phd.70B: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστewς, ὥς ἔστι τς ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Isoc.3,8: "For the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public (ταῖς γὰρ πίστεσιν αἷς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πείθoμεν), we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts." Antipho Her.84: ...καὶ πίστιν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτην σαφεστάτην ἀπέφαινον, τὰ σημεῖα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν.

A.'s word for refutation of an argument is ἔλεγχος. Cf. APr.66b11: "...if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion, a refutation must take place (ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἔλεγχον); for refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradiction (ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός)." Cf. also Sb165a2: ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμός μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος, -; Rh.1410a22: ὁ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν, and the heading of "De Sophisticis Elenohis" 164a20: "Now let us discuss sophistic refutation, i.e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead (παραλογισμοί)." Common Greek usage has the word in the sense of testing for the purpose of refutation: cf. e.g. Parm.1.36: κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολυδερὴν ἔλεγχον. Pl.Phdr.273C: "The coward will not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his opponent a chance to confute him (τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πη παραδοίῃ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ) Thuc.3,53: "...but we have had to ask leave to speak, and that the question which is put to us is so curt that a truthful answer to it is against our interests, while a false one can be exposed at once (τὰ δὲ ψεύδη ἔλεγχον ἔχει). Hdt. 2,23: ὁ δὲ περὶ τοῦ Ῥακάνου λέξας ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνένεικας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον (it is impossible to disprove it by argument).

A more general term for refutation is ἀναίρεσις (ἀναιρεῖν). For its use cf. e.g. APr.62b30: διαφέρει δ' ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀποδεικτικὴ τῆς δεικτικῆς τῇ τιθέναι ὁ βούλεται ἀναιρεῖν, ἀπάγουσα εἰς ὁμολογούμενον ψεῦδος. The technical use of the noun does not occur before A. For the verb cf. Pl.Rep.633C: οὐκοῦν...ἡ διαλεκ-

⁵⁸ But cf. also APo.90b13: ἱκανὴ δὲ πίστις καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. Top.103b3 ff.: μία μὲν πίστις ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς...ἄλλη δὲ πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ. These passages indicate that the word is used by A. also in a more general sense for all kinds of proof.

λεπτική μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται..., and in the sense of "to annul" Aeschin.3,39: "The question of the removal of one set of laws (τοὺς μὲν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν νόμων)." Isoc.1,14: ἐβουλήθη ταύτας τὰς διαθήκας ἀναλεῖν. A. Ath.19,4: τὰς τῶν παρανόμων γραφὰς καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τὰς προσκλήσεις ἀναίλον.

Ἀναιρῶ and διαίρῶ are distinguished SE176b36: ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινόμενους διελόντα λύειν.⁶⁰ For this use of the word cf. also Top.104 b36: διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ὁπωσοῦν λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὀνοματοποιῆσαι βουλόμενοι διείλομεν οὕτως αὐτά, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς τίνες αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι διαφοραί. For a similar meaning in general Greek usage cf. e.g. Pl.Prt.314B: ἡμεῖς γὰρ εἴτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πᾶγμα διελῆσθαι. For the Platonist use of division of genus into species cf. APr.46a13: "It is easy to see that division (διαίρεσις) into classes is a small part of the method we have described; for division is, so to speak, a weak syllogism; For what it ought to prove, it begs, and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question, etc."⁶¹

ἀνασχευάζω is often used as a synonym for ἀναιρῶ. For its use cf. APr.59b17: "In a word, it is not possible to refute universally (ἀνασχευάσασθαι καθόλου) by conversion the premiss which

⁵⁹ "Demonstration per impossibile differs from ostensive proof in that it posits what it wishes to refute by reduction to a statement admitted to be false; whereas ostensive proof starts from admitted positions."

⁶⁰ Cf. also 177a4: "So that those who wish to solve an argument should in the first place look and see if it is properly reasoned, and next, whether the conclusion be true or false, in order that we may effect the solution either by drawing some distinction (διαίρουντες) or by demolishing (ἀναιρουντες) something." 183a10: "...that whose solution clearly depends upon a distinction or a demolition (κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσιν)."

⁶¹ A distinction in another field is represented by Mete.386b25: "Some things are fissile (σχιστά), e.g. wood, some are not, e.g. potter's clay. A thing is fissile when it is apt to divide (διαίρεσθαι) in advance of the instrument dividing it (ἢ τὸ διαίρουν διαίρεσθαι· σχίζεται γὰρ ὅταν ἐπὶ πλέον διήρηται ἢ τὸ διαίρουν διαίρεσθαι, καὶ προηγείται ἢ διαίρεσις. ἐν δὲ τῇ τμήσει οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο. For διαίρῶ in this physical sense cf. e.g. Il.29,280: διὰ δ' ἄμφοτέρους ἔλε κύκλους ἀσπίδος. Hd1.1,119: παῖδα κατὰ μέλας διελών.

concerns the major extreme; for the refutation always proceeds (ἀναιρεῖται) through the third figure." Cf. also Rh.1401b4: ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινῶσαι κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν. The background in general usage may be found in such uses as Thuc.4,116: ...τὴν Ἀθηναίων καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνῆκεν ἅπαν - "after razing Eleuthus and clearing the ground (he) consecrated the whole place as a sacred precinct." X.Cyr.6.2.25: "For everything there (i.e. provisions) has been made away with (ἀνεσκευάσται γὰρ τὰ ἐν ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων δεσφύνατο)." Cf. also Dem.33,9: τῇ τραπεζῇ ἀνασκευασθείσης (of bankruptcy).

κατασκευάζω is used in the logical sense as opposite of both ἀναιρεῖν and ἀνασκευάζω in the sense of "to construct a positive argument" (Top.102a15; 110b9). In Attic Greek the word sometimes occurs in a somewhat derogatory sense, "to fix up", e.g. Dem. 21,110: καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων..., ὃ Πλουτάρχος ὁ τοῦτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπραξέτο, ὃς ἐγὼ αἰτιός εἰμι, κατασκευάζει πρὸ τοῦ πράγμα γενέσθαι πᾶσιν φανερόν διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.

A. sometimes also uses λύω in the sense of "to refute". Cf. e.g. Rh.1420b33: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρῖναι. οὐκ οὐκ ἰκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. For this sense of λύω cf. Pl.Grg.509A: "All this...is held firm and fastened...with reasons of steel...which you...must undo (οὐκ σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις, etc.)."

Top.162a12 A. makes the following distinctions: ὅταν δ' ἀποδείξεις ἢ τινὸς ὁ εἰρημένος λόγος, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ συμπέρασμα μηδαμῶς ἔχον, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ ἐκείνου συλλογισμός. ἂν δὲ φαίνεται, σόφισμα ἔσται, οὐκ ἀπόδειξις. ἔστι δὲ φιλοσόφημα μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς, ἐπιχείρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς, σόφισμα δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς, ἀπόρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς ἀντιφάσεως...⁶² Of these words φιλοσόφημα does not occur before A. Cael.279a30 A. uses the word in the sense of "treatise" (ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι). Cf. also 294a19. Polyb.34.4.4 also has the word in this broader sense. Through its derivation from φιλοσοφῶ it is the most elevated of this group of

The definition of σχίζω is in accord with general usage; cf. e.g. X.An.1.5.12 of splitting wood.

⁶² "Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated, but that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever on the conclusion, then no inference as to the latter can be drawn from it; and if there appears to be, it will be a sophism, not a proof. A philosopheme is a demonstrative infer-

terms. ἐπιχείρημα, which A. here uses to designate merely an attempted (i.e. dialectical as opposed to demonstrative) proof, particularly in attacking an opponent's proposition, appears in general Greek usage in the sense of "attempt", "undertaking". Cf. also Isoc.2,18: "And yet the mere attempt (ἐπιχείρημα) is well worth while - to seek a field that has been neglected by others and lay down principles for monarchs." Pl.Prt.317A: "Now to try to run away and to fail through being caught in the net, shows sad folly in the mere attempt (πολλῇ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος)." The verb ἐπιχειρεῖν is frequent throughout the Topics in the sense of "to argue or prove dialectically". ἀπόρημα is the dialectical method that studies a subject from various angles by raising objections and difficulties and endeavoring to solve them.. The word is rare outside of A. It occurs Pl.Phlb.36E: "Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing (ἃ νῦν δὴ προῦθέμεθα ἀπορήματα)." A. calls a sophism a contentious inference, that is, one which begins with false premisses or deliberately endeavors to deceive the opponent by fallacious reasoning. In general Greek usage the word may mean a clever trick or device (cf. e.g. Hdt.3,85 of the device by which Darius is made king), a sly trick (cf. Thuc.6,77: "Though the same sophisms are now practised on us - restorings of Leontine kinsmen and succoring of Eggestean allies."), or a captious or fallacious argument. (Cf. Pl.Rep.496A: "And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not deserve to be called sophisms, captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine or worthy of one akin to true wisdom?"(Jowett). Dem.25,18: ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὅτι μὲν πάντ' ἀπόλλυται τὰ ὀφλημάτων, εἰ τὰ τούτου σοφίσματα προσδέξασθε, καὶ ὅτι, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰς τῶν ὀφειλόντων ἀφιέναι, τοὺς ἐπιδεικνύσους καὶ βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡμιστά δεινοῖς ὀφληκότες δίκαιον ἂν εἴη, οὐχὶ τὸν πονηρότατον καὶ πλεῖσθ' ἡμαρτηκότα κτλ.

A more general word used by A. in the sense of fallacy is παραλογισμός. It represents a fallacy due to an unintentional mistake in reasoning. A. distinguishes two kinds: παρὰ τὴν λέξιν (having its origin in language) and ἐξω τῆς λέξεως (having its origin in the subject matter). Cf. SE165b23 ff. passim. For the word cf. Top.101a6: "...besides all the reasoning (συλλογισμοί)

ence; an epichireme is a dialectical inference; a sophism is a contentious inference; an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to a contradiction."

we have mentioned there are mis-reasonings (παράλογισμοί) that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences,, he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not true (figures wrongly drawn etc.)." For the word in general usage meaning "fallacy" cf. Lycourgus 152,4: ἐγὼ δ' ἡγοῦμαι πάντας ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι τῶν μὲν δεινῶν καὶ συκοφαντεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων ἔργον ἐστὶν ἄμα τοῦτο προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ζητεῖν τὰ χωρία ταῦτα, ἐν οἷς τοὺς παράλογισμοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ποιήσονται, τῶν δὲ δικαίως τὰς κρίσεις ἐνισταμένων κτλ.

In the list of categories Cat.1b30 τὸ ποιόν, "quality", is illustrated by "white", "grammatical", and at the beginning of the discussion of this category Cat.8b25 the following explanation is given: "By quality I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such (ποιοὶ τινες)." The word ποιότης is here used for "quality" instead of τὸ ποιόν. The substantival use of ποιός as well as the word ποιότης is first found in Plato, where these words appear in the same broad sense. Cf. Rep.438E: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ οὐπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινος, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιά δὴ τις ξυνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησε μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος προσγενομένου ἱατρικῇν. For ποιότης cf. Tht.182A, where Plato apologizes for the use of the word as an ἀλλόκοτον ὄνομα: ...καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθητὶν γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα· ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτον τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἄθροον λεγόμενον.

Under the heading of ποιότης A. treats of four ways according to which something may be called ποιόν τι: ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, φυσικὴ δύναμις, παθητικὴ ποιότης and σχῆμα καὶ μορφή.

In dealing with ἕξις and διάθεσις A. makes the following distinction: habit (ἕξις) differs from disposition (διάθεσις) in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and the virtues (e.g. δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη) are ἕξεις. Disposition (διάθεσις) is a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives way to the opposite. Heat, cold, health, disease are διαθέσεις. Διάθεσις thus is ephemeral, ἕξις is permanent and difficult to alter. But διάθεσις is used also as a wider term to include ἕξις. A. says Cat.9a10 ff.: "Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also (in virtue of that habit) to be thus or thus disposed;

but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit." In his answer to the question whether virtue is *πάθος*, *δύναμις*, or *ἕξις* A. gives the following explanation of *ἕξις* EN1105b19 ff.: *ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς οἶον πρὸς τὸ ἐργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφόδρως ἢ ἀνεπαρκῶς, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα.* The distinction is well founded in Greek usage, but not always observed. For *ἕξις* in a non-technical sense that is close to A.'s meaning cf. Pl.Rep.435B: "But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits of these three kinds." Lg.791B has both words in agreement with A.'s distinction: "The children it puts to sleep; the Bacchantes, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind (*ἕξεις ἔμφονας ἔχειν*) instead of a frenzied condition (*ἀντὶ μανικῶν...διαθέσεων*)..." Cf. also Cra.415D: "It is properly called *αἰσθητή*, or perhaps also *αἰσθητή*, indicative that this condition is especially to be chosen (*ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως αἰσθητάτης*). Phlb.48C: *κακὸν μὲν ἄγνοια καθ' ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἕξιν.* Sph.230D: "...and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more...that is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind (*σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἕξεων αὕτη*)", and 247A with a somewhat different meaning, in which the active force of *ἔχω* is felt: "And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice (*δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρούσῃ*)?" Cf. also Isoc.12,32: "Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but with all of them (*πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντες*)", and 15,185: "Watching over them and training them in

⁶³ "The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other feelings." The last two meanings assigned to *ἕξις* Metaph.1022b3 ff. also belong here, b10 ff.: *ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διαθέσις καθ' ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διακρίνεται τὸ διακρίμενον, καὶ ἡ καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἶον ὑγίεια ἕξις τις· διαθέσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ὅτι ἕξις λέγεται ἂν ἡ μόνον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης· οἶον καὶ ἡ τῶν μέρων ἀρετὴ ἕξις τις ἐστί.* The distinction marked out Cat.8b25 ff. is not observed here, when health is spoken of as a *ἕξις*. *ἕξις* here means both 'habit' and 'permanent state'. Cf. Ross's note.

this manner, both the teachers of gymnastics and the teachers of discourse are able to advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in the use of their bodies (ἔχειν ἄμεινον, τοὺς μὲν τὰς διανοίας τοὺς δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ἔξεις)." For ἔξεις as a transitory condition of. Pl.Rep.407D: "...that for those who were by nature and course of life (φύσει - διαίτη ὑγιαίνῶς ἔχοντες) sound of body, but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit (ἔξεις) he revealed the art of medicine." ἔξεις and διάθεσις are used together more loosely Pl.Phlb.32E: "First then, let us agree on this point: 'If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions (τίνα ποτὲ ἔξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις). Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions (ἐν τῇ τότε χρόνῳ) necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain and pleasure, great and small? - Yes, necessarily. - Have we then a third condition (τρίτη ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη διάθεσις), besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?" 11D: "That each of us will next try to prove clearly that it is a condition and disposition (ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν) of the soul which can make life happy for all human beings?" For διάθεσις, ⁶⁵ which is rare in the meaning assigned to it by A., of. e.g. Pl.Sph.264D: "But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind (ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν)." For a more comprehensive use of. Rep.579E: ...ἴαν τις δλην ψυχὴν (of the tyrant) ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδύνων πλήρης, εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἥς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. Def.414C: ἔξεις διάθεσις ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ποιοῖ τινες λεγόμεθα.

The second ποιότης, distinguished from ἔξεις and διάθεσις is described as follows Cat.9a15: "Another quality is that in vir-

⁶⁴Cf. the note by Professor Shorey in the Loeb edition.

⁶⁵The meaning assigned to διάθεσις Metaph.1022b1 is different from the one given the word Cat.9a10: "'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind: For there must be a certain position, as even the word 'disposition' shows." For this usage outside of A. of. e.g. Pl.Lg.710B: ἁμείνων πολιτείας διάθεσιν. Ti.27A: "Consider the order of the feast as we have arranged it (τῶν ἐστίων...διάθεσιν...

tue of which we call men good boxers or runners or healthy or sickly; in fact, it includes all those terms which refer to an inborn capacity or incapacity (ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται)." This δύναμις φυσικὴ is "an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease", such as running or boxing. - "Men are also called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise." - Similarly, hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capa-

 ἡ διέθεμεν)." Isoc.15,310: "Many ideas crowd into my thoughts, but I do not know how I can make place for them (πῶς αὐτοὺς διαθῆμαι)." 66

Of the three meanings assigned to ἔξεις Metaph.1022b5 the first is set forth as follows: ἔξεις δὲ λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ὅλον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἔχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξις τις ἢ κίνησις, ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποιήσις μεταξύ. οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἔσθῃται καὶ τῆς ἔχομένης ἔσθῃτός ἐστι μεταξύ ἔξεις. ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερόν ἐστι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἔξιν· εἰς ἀπειρον γὰρ βαδίζεται, εἰ τοῦ ἔχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν. This use of ἔξεις appears Cat.12a25 and in many other passages as the opposite of στέρησις, "privation". The explanation Cat.12a26: "'Privatives' (στερησεις) and 'positives' (ἐξεις) have reference to the same subject. Thus sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that which is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should..." This is also the third meaning assigned to στέρησις Metaph.1022b27: "(We speak of 'privation') if (something), though it would naturally have it, has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not 'blind' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one naturally would have it, etc." For this meaning of ἔξεις (related to the transitive sense of ἔχω) cf. e.g. Pl.Tht.197B: "They say it is having knowledge (ἐπιστήμης...ἔξιν). ...Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge (ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν)." Rep. 433E: (in the sense of "having"): "From this point of view too, then, the having and doing (ἔξεις τε καὶ πρᾶξις) of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice." Cf. Professor Shorey's note, Loeb edition. Lg.625C: "...for what reason did your law ordain...your gymnastic schools and military equipment (τὴν τῶν

city of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration. The opposites - unhealthy, soft - are predicated by reason of the lack of such a capacity." - This special sense of δύναμις is common in Greek usage for the first example. Men δύνανται box or run. But it is difficult to find examples of the use of δύναμις in the extension to the other examples of capacity to resist disease or to resist disintegration. Cf. Pl.La.192B: "The faculty (δύναμις) that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness." Prt.320D: "...they charged to Prometheus and Epimetheus to deal to each the equipment of his proper faculty (νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει)...having thus persuaded him he dealt; and in dealing he attached strength without speed to some, while the weaker he equipped with speed etc." Phdr.246D: "The natural function (πέφυκεν - δύναμις) of the wing is to soar upward." Isoc.13,14: "For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those who are well-endowed by nature (αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἀπάντων ἐν τοῖς εὐφύεσιν ἐγγίγνονται) and have been schooled by practical experience." 12,29: "I have the same fault to find also with those who are skilled in oratory (δημογορεῖν δυνάμενοι) and those who are distinguished for their writings and in general with all who have superior attainments in the arts, in the sciences, and in specialized skill (περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων)."

In the group πάθος, δύναμις, ἔξις EN1105b20 ff. δύναμις is defined as follows: δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι. For this use of δύναμις, i.e. to be capable of anger or pity or any vice or virtue, cf. e.g. Pl.La.192B: "What faculty is it...that has been singled out by the name of courage?" Rep.430B: "This power (δύναμις) in the soul than, this unfailing conservation of sight and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage"; with a somewhat wider application Lg.840C: "Will not the dread that this is a thing utterly unholy give them power to master those impulses which men

ὀπλων ἔξιν); "στέρησις in the technical use of A. is not found in general usage; the word regularly means the loss of something one has had; cf. e.g. Thuc.2,63: "...loss of empire is also involved (ἀρχῆς στέρησις)." Pl.Lg.865B: "If a man kills another...by deprivation of air (στερήσει πνεύματος)." Cf. also Hdt.6,117: "Ἀθηναῖον ἄνδρα...ἐν τῇ συστάσει μαχόμενόν τε καὶ ἄνδρα γινόμενον ἄγαθὸν τῶν ὀμμάτων στέρηθῆναι. 9,93: τῆς ὄψιος στέρηθῆναι.

inferior to themselves have mastered?" The use of the noun in this sense is rare.

Cat.9a27ff. A. makes the following distinction between πάθος and ποιότης: "Those conditions, however, which arise from causes that may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed are not called qualities (ποιότητες) but affections (πάθη), for we are not said to be ποιοί in virtue of them." The examples given for πάθος are blushing (from shame), being irritable (ὀργιλωτέρος) when vexed as distinguished from being bad-tempered (ὀργιλος, a ξεῖς, EN1125b30). From these πάθη A. distinguishes what he calls παθητικοὶ ποιότητες, "affective qualities". By these he means those qualities that are capable of producing a πάθος in the way of perception. Examples are sweetness, bitterness, sourness, heat, cold, whiteness, blackness. Things which admit these qualities are not affected in this way, but are capable of producing an affection, e.g. sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste. He also mentions conditions (in human beings) which are caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, e.g. chronic pallor or duskiness of complexion, such as originates in the natural constitution or comes about through long disease or sunburn and are difficult to remove or remain throughout life. The meaning which A. here gives to πάθος is one of its regular meanings, but the distinction which would limit πάθος to conditions which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective is not generally observed and A. does not abide by it when he uses πάθος also for those qualities which he here designates as ποιότητες παθητικοί.⁶⁷ For examples illustrating A.'s definition of. e.g. Isoc.12,95: "I perceive that my feelings are changing to the opposite (αἰσθάνομαι δὲ πάθος μου συμβαῖνον ἐναντίον) of those which I described a little while ago. For then I fell into a state of doubt and perplexity..., but now I realize

⁶⁷ The distinction is ignored in the definitions of Metaph.1022b15: "Affection' means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. - (2) the actualization of these - the already accomplished alterations. - (3) especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries. - (4) misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections." For the first of these meanings cf. e.g. Pl.Hp.Ma. 285C: "Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens (τὰ οὐράνια πάθη)?" Phd.96: τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη ... for the second Euthyphro 11A: καὶ κινδυνεύεις...ἐρωτώμενος τὸ δόσιον,

...that I am not keeping the mildness of speech...I am more aggressive (θρασύτερον), etc." 15,310: "Indeed I fear that in what I have already said to you I may have fatigued you by speaking at such length (μὴ τοιοῦτον τι πάθος, i.e. putting too great a strain upon the hearers, αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τυγχάνη συμβεβηκός)." Dem. 18,45: "...the unofficial classes and the people in general were either blind to the future or ensnared by the listlessness and indolence of their daily life; in all the malady had gone so far (καὶ τοῦτονί τι πάθος πεπονθότων ἀπάντων) that they expected the danger to descend anywhere but upon themselves." Pl.Phdr.250A: "But these ...are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not understand their condition (ὁ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι) because they do not clearly perceive. Ti.43E: "Suppose... that a man is in an upside down position...in this position of the man relative to that of the onlookers (ἐν τοῦτῳ τῷ πάθει) etc." The most common meaning, however, of πάθος in A. is that assigned to it in the distinction πάθος, δύναμις, ξέις EN1105b20: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον φθόνον χάραν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἐπεταὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη (by the feelings I mean desire, anger...and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain). This is a common usage; cf. e.g. the Platonic phrase ἐρώτικον πάθος. In general the word πάθος in its various applications is given an extension by A. that goes beyond the range of the common usage of the word.

The fourth kind of quality is designated Cat.10a11 as σχῆμα and μορφή: "The figure and the shape that belongs to a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved." No distinction is made here between σχῆμα and μορφή, and the explanation offered for the combined terms rather fits the common use of σχῆμα as outward form or shape. The particular application of σχῆμα to mathematical figures is common in A. (cf. e.g. Metaph.1020a35: "A circle is a figure - σχῆμα - of a particular quality because it is without angles."), but in Greek usage (as well as with A.) the word has a wider meaning, denoting any kind of external appearance. Cf. e.g. (X.)Rep.Ath.2,8: οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἰδίᾳ μᾶλλον καὶ φώνῃ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι χρῶνται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένην ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων. Pl.La.423D: ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φώνη καὶ σχῆμα ἐκάστω. For an example of the mathematical

ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὄσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν...; for the other two e.g. Soph.Aj.933: οὐλίφ σὺν πάθει. Pl.Rep.380A: τὰ τῆς Μιόβης πάθη, etc.

use cf. Theophr. H. Pl. 1.12.1: αἱ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χύλους καὶ τὰ σχῆμα-
τα καὶ τὰς ὅλας μορφὰς (διαφοραὶ τῶν καρπῶν) σχεδὸν φανεραὶ πᾶσιν,
ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι λόγου· πλὴν τοσοῦτόν γ' σχῆμα οὐδὲν περικάρπιον
εὐθύγραμμον οὐδὲ γωνίᾳς ἔχει. The relation of μορφή to σχῆμα in
common usage is evident from Eur. I. T. 292: παρῆν δ' ὄρᾱν οὐ ταῦτα
μορφῆς σχήματα, ἀλλ' ἡλλάσσετο φθόγγας τε μόσχων κτλ.

III.

The discussion of A.'s synonyms in the field of psychology presents unusual difficulties. These difficulties have their source first in the nature of the subject and the fact that A. has not worked out a clear cut system with a definite and rigorously applied terminology. Some terms are discussed at length, often terms of minor importance, and in the case of some of the most important terms the discussions are fragmentary, not fully consistent with each other, and otherwise unsatisfactory. A second difficulty rises from the fact that in working out his system A., in drawing on popular language for words to designate some concept that he has worked out, frequently singles out only one of the various meanings which a word may have and fixes or adapts this meaning for the vacant place in his system; however, the definitions made are not consistently upheld, and it is frequently difficult to decide whether the new technical meaning or one of the popular, loose meanings is in A.'s mind.¹

The chief sources for the distinctions between psychological terms are the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, the De Anima, and the third and sixth books of the Nicomachean Ethics. Most of the terms for which A. offers definitions occur in the sixth book of N.E., and this book will therefore serve as a convenient starting point. In the third book of N.E. A. works out his doctrine of the will, and "choice (προαίρεσις)" is described as consisting of two elements: good appetite (ὄρεξις) and the right reason (ὁρθὸς λόγος), which finds the proper mean. Then the individual virtues are discussed in detail and the mean is established for each. The exact definition of the rational element, the "right reason" in moral action, has meanwhile been suspended, and A. returns to it in the sixth book. This leads him to a discussion of all the virtues, a discussion that is necessary in preparation for the final discussion in the tenth book of εὐδαιμονία as the end of man. In introducing his discussion of the intellectual virtues A. divides the subject matter with which mental operations deal into two great fields, the necessary, i.e. the field of theoretical speculation and abstract thought, and the contin-

¹ Cf. Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, II, 46.

gent, i.e. the field of practical action in all its aspects. Then he assigns to each field definite intellectual virtues. Those dealing with necessary truth are summed up under σοφία, the supreme intellectual virtue, those dealing with contingent truth under φρόνησις, practical wisdom.

φρόνησις, "practical wisdom", is the dominating concept of the sixth book of N.E. A. defines it as an intellectual virtue directly concerned with moral action (EN1140b4): λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἰναι ἕξειν ἀληθοῦ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ. A. thus limits φρόνησις to the field of practical action, and in doing so he follows a well developed line of common usage, though the general use of the word is wider; and the most

² It remains therefore that it is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings." Cf. also EN1141b10: "Prudence (φρόνησις) on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men and with things that can be the object of deliberation."

³ Cf. e.g. the following: Il.6,79: "In every undertaking ye are the best both in war and in counsel (μάχεσθαί τε φρονεῖν τε)." Aesch. Ag.176: "Zeus - τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὀδῶσαντα." Soph.O.T.617: φρονεῖν γὰρ οἱ ταχεῖς οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς. 692: "Witless were I proved, insane, if I lightly put away thee, my country's prop and stay (παρὰ φρόνιμον, ἄπορον ἐπὶ φρόνιμα). Ant.1348: κολλᾷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας πρῶτον ὑπάρχει. Ar.Lys.548: ἔνι δὲ σοφόν, ἔνι δὲ φιλόπολις ἀρετὴ φρόνιμος. Isoc.3,9: "None of these things that are done with intelligence (οὐδὲν τῶν φρονίμως πραττομένων) takes place without the help of speech." 12,204: "For there is no one who, among the ways of life, will not give preference to the practical reverence in religion to the Gods and of justice in relation to mankind and of wisdom in relation to all activities in general (καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις)." X.Cyr.5.5.44: "Cyrus collected those of his friends who were most able to think and to cooperate with him (φρονεῖν καὶ συμπράττειν)." An.2.6.7: ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς φρόνιμος. Cyr.1.6.21: "For people are only too glad to obey the man who they believe takes wiser thought for their interests than they themselves do (φρονιμώτερον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι). Pl. Smp.209A: "Now by far the highest and fairest part of prudence (φρονήσεως) is that which concerns the regulation of cities and habitations." Lg.906B: "What destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly (ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀπροσύνης); what saves us...justice and temperance combined with wisdom (δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως)." Prt.337C: (Prodicus):...For he is com-

general usage, found in Plato, in which the word is virtually a synonym of σοφία, ἐπιστήμη, etc., is also well founded in Greek usage. But the word usually has a practical coloring, also when having the wider meaning of "mind", "intellect" (φρόνιμος - intelligent; φρονεῖν - to be intelligent), and when it does not mean

forted who learns something and gets a share of good sense in his mind alone (μὴνθάνοντά.τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ). Men.88C: "And in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom (ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως) end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite?"

⁴ Cf. e.g. Soph.E1.1059: ἀλλ' εἰ σεαυτῇ τυγχάνεις δοκοῦσά τι φρονεῖν, φρονεῖ τοιαῦθ'... X.Cyr.3.3.57: "The front rank men followed gladly, because they were intelligent men (διὰ τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν)... They had become convinced by long instruction (ἐμαμαθήμεσιν) that the safest way was to meet the enemy hand to hand." Isoc.1,5: "Strength in company with wisdom (ρῶμη μετὰ φρονήσεως) is indeed an advantage." 7,14: "For the soul of a state is nothing else than its polity, having as much power over it as the mind (φρόνησις) over the body." 217: "I said this, not with any thought of reverence or justice or wisdom (φρόνησις), the virtues which you mentioned." 15,212: "Nay, so great is the misfortune which they impute to us all, that while they would acknowledge that it is by our mental powers (διανοίαις) that every creature is improved and made more useful, yet they have the hardihood to claim that we ourselves, who are endowed with an intelligence (ἔχοντες τὴν φρόνησιν ταύτην) through which we render all creatures of greater worth, cannot help each other to advance in excellence." 13,2: "Foreknowledge of future events is not vouchsafed to our human nature, but we are so far removed from this prescience (φρονήσεως) that Homer who has been conceived the highest reputation for wisdom (ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ δόξαν), has pictured the gods as debating about the future." Dem. 18,277: "In general an audience controls the ability of a speaker, and his reputation for wisdom depends on your acceptance and your discriminating favor (οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν κτλ.)" 282: "Who is the deceiver of his country? Surely the man who does not say what he thinks (ὁ μὴ λέγων ἃ φρονεῖ). 48: "Though the right time for action is past, for wise men it is always the right time to understand history (ἄνελ πάρεστι τοῖς φρονοῦσιν)." Pl.A1c.I.125A: καλοὺς καγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἄφρονας...ὁ σκυτότομος φρόνιμος. Rep.349D: ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφη, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀδίκος.

⁵ Cf. e.g. Pl.Smp.202A: "Correct opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα)...nor yet is-

"prudence" or "practical wisdom".⁷ A. discusses in great detail various aspects of φρόνησις and introduces other terms designating operations of the mind which are component parts of φρόνησις, but are carefully distinguished from it, such as σύνεσις, εὐβουλία, γνῶμη, etc. Such aspects as the assertion that the φρόνιμος is one

 norance...so correct opinion...is between understanding (φρονήσεως) and ignorance." Phlb.63A: "...we said it was harmless and useful to know (ἐπίστασθαι) all the arts (τέχναις) throughout our life, ...if we now say the same of pleasure...what shall we say about these pleasures?...We must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences (φρονήσεις) about one another." Rep.461A: ἄκμῃ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως. 586D: αἱ μὲν (ἐπιθυμίας) ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσιν, ἅς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῇται, λαμβάνωσι. Alc.I.133C: ἔχουμεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θεϊότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστι. Phlb.88B: τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτῶν συγγενῆ, δόξαν δὲ ὁρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω κτλ. Hip.Ma.366A: τοὺς ψευδεῖς φῆς εἶναι δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονίμους καὶ ἐπιστήμονας καὶ σοφοὺς εἰς ἅπερ ψευδεῖς. Phlb.13E: φρόνησις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἰχθῆ. 21B: "But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants (τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα). Rep.432A: "...whether in wisdom (φρονήσει) or...in strength (ἰσχύϊ)." - Just before σοφία had been used: "...its (σωπροσύνη) operation is much like that of courage and wisdom (σοφία)." Prt.352C: "Do you agree...that whoever learns (γινώσκων) what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) bids, and that intelligence (φρόνησις) is a sufficient succor for mankind?" Lg.963C φρόνησις appears as one of the four virtues instead of σοφία. For φρόνησις in Plato cf. also Needler, The Relation of the Eudemian to the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p.37 ff.; Hans Meyer, Platon und die aristotelische Ethik, p.62 ff.

6 Cf. Isoc.15,271: "For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science (ἐπιστήμην) by the possession of which we can positively know what we should do or what we should say, in the next rank I hold that man to be wise (σοφούς) who is able by his powers of conjecture (ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυχάνειν) to arrive generally at the best course. And I hold that man to be a philosopher (φιλοσόφους) who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight (φρόνησιν)." 5,110: "It was more by his wisdom, his lofty ambition, and his justice (τῇ

who deliberates well (the function of "right reason" in προαίρεσις),⁸ the division of φρόνησις into particular wisdom as related to oneself, to household management, and to state affairs, the elevation of the term over the other terms mentioned as composing its parts (EN1142b1 ff.), the examples from public life,¹⁰ and the broad sense

φρονήσει καὶ τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ) than by his strength of body that your ancestor surpassed all who lived before his day." Dem.61,40: ἐν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο σέ δεῖ καταμεῖν ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι πᾶσα μὲν παιδεία δι' ἐπιστήμης καὶ μελέτης τινὸς συνέστηκεν, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα γὰρ φρονιμώτερος ἔχει τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας, τοσοῦτω κάλλιον αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι προσήκει. 26,25: εὐρήσετε γὰρ τὴν μὲν τὰ τῆς μανίας καὶ ἀκрасίας καὶ πλεονεξίας, τοὺς δὲ τὰ τῆς φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργα διαπραττομένους... Hyp.VI,38: οἱ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθερώσαντες ἐντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν, ἐνδοξον δὲ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὃν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπερέσχευ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ φρονήσει, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἡμύναντο. X.Smp.8.14: "The soul becomes more and more lovable as it progresses towards wisdom (ἐπὶ τὸ φρονιμώτερον)."

⁷ Cf. e.g. Il.6,79: "In every undertaking ye are the best, both in war and in counsel (μάχεσθαί τε φρονεῖν τε)." Aesch.Pr.1000: "End thy will to wisdom in the face of present suffering (τόλμησον ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν)." Soph.O.T.616: φρονεῖν γὰρ οἱ ταχεῖς οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς. Ar. Ach.971 of the φρόνιμος ἄνθρωπος, who made a private treaty. X.Apol. 20: "The people of Athens follow the advice of those whose words are the wisest (τοῖς φρονιμώτατα λέγουσιν)." Mem.4.8.11: Socrates was φρόνιμος...ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χεῖρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐταρχῆς εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τοῦτων γνῶσιν. Isoc.2,10: "Those who pronounce on matters of great moment...must be...superior to all others in intelligence (φρονιμώτερον)." 13,15: (Formal training - παιδευσιν-)...is capable of leading them ...to a greater degree of intelligence (φρονιμωτέρως διακεῖσθαι) on many subjects." 12,136: "I have never concerned myself with such auditors, any more than do other sensible men (εὐ φρονούσιν)." 173: "The intelligent class in Sparta held that such men were foolish (οὓς οὐκ εὐ φρονεῖν ἡγεῖσθαι Σπαρτιατῶν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας)." Dem. 20,25: "If anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgment is at fault (οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ)." 19,270: "An honest judgment costs you no more pains and vexation than a vicious judgment (τὸ καλῶς φρονεῖν τοῦ κακῶς)." Pl. Men.88B: "And in brief, all the undertaking and endurance of the soul, when guided by wisdom (ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως) end in happiness, but when folly (ἄφροσύνης) guides, in the opposite?"

in which *φρόνησις* relates not merely to activity (*πράξις*) but also to *ποίησις* and so includes *τέχνη* (EN1143b14; cf. Greenwood, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six, p.37) are well founded in Greek usage.¹¹ A. is aware also of the broad general use, and when exactness of terminology is not required as in this technical dis-

Lg.906B: "What saves us is justice and temperance combined with wisdom (*μετὰ φρονήσεως*). " La.192C: *μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία* is *ἀνδρεία*. - For *φρόνησις* directed to evil ends cf. Hp.Mi.365E: "Are they wily and deceivers by reason of simplicity and folly (*ἡλιθιότητος καὶ ἀφροσύνης*) or by reason of shrewdness and a sort of intelligence (*ὅπῃ πανουργίας καὶ φρονήσεως τινός*)?" and X.Ag.1.17: "He made shrewd use of this occasion to enrich his friends."

⁸ Cf. EN1140a25: "Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man (*φρονίμου*) to be able to deliberate well (*καλῶς βουλευσασθαι*) about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as means to the good life in general."

⁹ Cf. EN1141b30: "Prudence is also commonly understood to mean especially that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the name of Prudence, which really belongs to all kinds, while the others are distinguished as Domestic Economy (*οἰκονομία*), Legislature (*νομοθεσία*), and Political Science (*πολιτική*), the latter being subdivided into Deliberative Science (*βουλευτική*) and Judicial Science (*δικαστική*)...Yet probably as a matter of fact a man cannot pursue his own welfare without Domestic Economy and even Politics."

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. EN1140b8: "Hence men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind; and that is our conception of an expert in Domestic Economy or Political Science."

¹¹ Cf. Dem.14,8: "It is difficult to display courage in the face of danger and in deliberation to offer sounder advice than one's fellows (*ἐν δὲ τῷ συμβουλευεῖν φρονιμώτερα τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν ἔχειν*). 6,18: "Assuming that you are intelligent (*εὖ φρονεῖν*) he thinks that you are bound to hate him." Isoc.12,32: "...those who are not spoiled by successes and do not desert their true selves and become arrogant, but hold their ground steadfastly as intelligent men (*τῇ τᾷδε: τῇ τῶν εὖ φρονούντων*) not rejoicing in the good things which have come to them through chance rather than in those which through their own nature and intelligence (*φρόνησιν*) are theirs from their birth...these are wise (*φρόνιμοι*) and complete men..." X.Cyr.5.2.

cussion, he sometimes uses the word in the wider sense as Plato had used it¹² and as it was used in philosophic and non-philosophic language.

σοφία as distinguished from φρόνησις is defined by A. as dealing with necessary truth and is the term used to designate the highest intellectual virtue. It is described EN1141a9 ff. as fol-

17: φρόνιμοι καὶ μέτριοι (at meals). - For φρόνησις in state affairs cf. e.g. Dem.18,40: "If you Thebans and Thessalians are wise (ἐὺ φρονεῖτε) you will treat them as your enemies." Pl.Smp.209A: "Now by far the highest and fairest part of prudence (τῆς φρονήσεως) is that which concerns the regulation of cities and habitations; it is called sobriety and justice (σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη)." Isoc.2,14: "You consider it monstrous that the more foolish should (τοὺς ἀνοητοτέρους) give orders to men of greater wisdom (τοῖς φρονιμοτέροις)." X.Cyr.1.6.21 supra. Ar.Eq.1364: τουτὶ μὲν ὁρθῶς καὶ φρονίμως ἤδη λέγεις· τὰ δ' ἄλλα, φερ' ἴδω, πῶς πολιτεύσει φράσσον. X.Hipparch.7.4: "Much sagacity (φρόνησις) is called for in coping with a greatly superior force." Isoc.9,41: ἡγούμενος μὲν εἰ καλῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ φρόνησιν παρασκευάσειεν, ὁμοίως αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔξειν. - The elevation of the term appears in such passages as Isoc.5,110: ραδίως μὲν ἐπέδειξα τὸν πρόγονον ὑμῶν καὶ τῇ φρονήσει καὶ τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ πλέον διανεγκότα κτλ. 12,204: "For there is no one who, among the ways of life, will not give preference to the practice of reverence in religion to the Gods and of justice in relation to mankind and of wisdom in relation to all activities in general (καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις)." For examples of "prudent men" cf. Isoc.12,72: "Messene furnished Nestor, the wisest (τὸν φρονιμώτατον) who lived in those times." 15,235: "Pericles studied under...Damon...in his day reputed to be the wisest (φρονιμώτατος) among the Athenians" --- 5,86: "Agesilaus...was looked upon as the most sagacious (φρονιμώτατος) of the Lacedaemonians." - For examples of the broad use including τέχνη cf. Pl.Grg.409B: "One of us, a doctor (ἰατρός), is wiser (φρονιμώτερος) than the others in this matter." Pl.Alc.I. 125A: καλοὺς καγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονας;...Σκυτότομος φρόνιμος. X.Cyr.1.6.15: "Thereupon I joined myself to those who I heard were most proficient in those branches (φρονίμους περὶ τούτων, i.e. military science)." Pl.Phlb.63A: "And as we said it was harmless and useful to know all the arts (τέχνας)...we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences (φρονήσεις) about one another."

lows: "The term wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν) is employed in the arts (ἐν ταῖς τέχναις) to denote those men who are the most perfect masters of their art (τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας), for instance, it is applied to Pheidias as a sculptor and to Polycleitus as a statuary. In this use then wisdom (σοφία) merely signifies artistic excellence (ἄρετὴ τέχνης ἐστὶ). But we also think that some people are wise in general (ὀλως) and not in one department... Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom (σοφία) must be a combination of Intelligence (νοῦς) and scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη): it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted subjects." For the distinction from φρόνησις cf. EN1141a20-b22 ff.¹³ This technical use of A. marks a complete dissociation from the practical and ethical aspects which the word had had in general usage¹⁴ and is the result of a development of meaning that has its

¹²Cf. e.g. Top.138b2: ὅλον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον καὶ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ πρῶτον σῶφρον, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον, εἴη ἂν ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον σῶφρον. 163b9: "Moreover as contributing to knowledge and philosophic wisdom (πρὸς τε γνῶσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν φρόνησιν) the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument." Cael. 298b23: "When they saw, what no one previously had seen, that there could be no knowledge or wisdom (τὴν γνῶσιν ἢ φρόνησιν) without such unchanging entities." Metaph.1078b15: "...if knowledge or thought is to have an object (εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις), there must be some other and permanent entities." Cf. Ross's note. Pol.1289a12: "The same political insight (μετὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως) will enable a man to know which laws are best." For φρόνησις as applied to animals cf. Metaph.980b21: "Therefore the former (i.e. those animals which have memory) are more intelligent (φρονιμώτερα) and apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent (φρόνιμα) though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee etc." With this compare EN1141a27: "Hence even some of the lower animals are said to be prudent (φρόνιμα), namely those which display a capacity for forethought as regards their own lives."

¹³Cf. also Metaph.981a25 ff. and Professor Shorey's notes on Rep. 428B, Loeb ed.

inception with the beginnings of philosophic thought.¹⁵

ἐπιστήμη, "scientific knowledge", one of the component parts of σοφία, and as such restricted to the field of necessary truth, is defined EN1139b19 ff. as follows: "The nature of Scien-

¹⁴For this dissociation cf. EN1141b2 ff.: "These considerations therefore show that Wisdom is both Scientific Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and Intuitive Intelligence (νοῦς) as regards things of the most exalted nature. This is why people say that Anaxagoras and Thales may be wise (σοφοί) but are not prudent (φρονίμους), when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous, difficult, and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge to be useless because these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings." For σοφία in the sense of "practical skill" in various aspects cf. e.g. IL.15,412: "But as the carpenter's line maketh straight a ship's timber in the hands of a cunning workman, that is well skilled in all manner of craft (ὃς ῥά τε πάσης εὖ εἰδὴ σοφίης...)." Pind.O.754: "To the wise man (δάεοντι) even surpassing art (σοφία μείζων) is no magic power." I.117: "Foremost in the lore of song (πρόφαντον σοφίᾳ)." Aesch.Sep.382: "The wise seer, Oecles' son (μάντιν...σοφόν)." Soph.Ant.1059: σοφὸς μάντις. Eur. Alc.348: "Fashioned by craftsmen's cunning hands (σοφῇ δὲ χειρί)." I.T.1238: ἄν κτεάρα σοφόν. Ar.Ra.766: "Until another comes, more wise than he in the same art (τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος);" i.e. poetry. X.Mem.4.2.33: "Daedalus was seized by Minos διὰ τὴν σοφίαν." An.1.2.8: "Apollo played Marsyas, after having defeated him in a contest of musical skill (ἐρίζοντά οἱ περὶ σοφίας)." Pl.Rep.406B: "...struggling against death by reason of his science (ὕπὸ σοφίας) he won the prize of a dotting old age." For the ethical connotation in the sense of knowing how to order one's life and one's affairs cf. Hdt.1,30: εἴρετο ὁ Κροΐσος τόδε: εἶπε Ἀθηναῖς, πὰρ ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ τέο λόγος ἀπικται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς. Aesch. fr.286A: ὁ χρησίμ' εἰδὼς, οὐχ ὁ πολλ' εἰδὼς, σοφός. Pr.1038: "Seek the good counsel of wisdom (τὴν σοφὴν εὐβουλίαν)." Soph.El.1016: προνοίαξ οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' κέρδος λαβεῖν ἀμεινον οὐδὲ νοῦ σοφοῦ. Eur.Hec.238: σοφόν τοι μὲν κακίστ' ἃ δεῖ φρονεῖν. Pl.Prt.321D: τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτην ἔσχε, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν. X.Ag.11.9: "...and wisdom (σοφίαν) he cultivated more by action than in words."

¹⁵For non-technical uses of the word with predominantly intellectual meanings, e.g. in the sense of "intellectual superiority", "cleverness", cf. Soph.O.T.504: σοφία δ' ἂν σοφίαν παραμείψειεν ἀνὴρ

tific Knowledge (employing the term in its exact sense and disregarding its analogous uses) can be made clear as follows. We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically (ἐπιστάμεθα) cannot vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our observation we do not know whether it exists or not. An object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity ... Now induction supplies a first principle or universal, deduction works from universals; therefore there are first principles from which deduction starts, which cannot be proved by deduction; therefore they are reached by induction. Scientific Knowledge, therefore, is the quality whereby we demonstrate (by deduction), with the further qualifications included in our definition of it in the

and 509: καὶ σοφὸς ὄφθῃ βασάνῳ in vanquishing the Sphinx). Thuc.3, 37: "The latter (i.e. the εὐνοτοί) always want to show that they are wiser than the laws (νόμων σοφώτεροι)." Dem.5,11: "One...was good luck, which my experience tells me is worth all the cleverness and wisdom (δαιμόνητος καὶ σοφίας) in the world." 18,228: (in a bad sense) "...by his ingenious apologue (ἐκ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σοφοῦ τούτου παραδειγματός)." - For the application to the beginnings of philosophy cf. e.g. Pl.Ap.19C: καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγε τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστίν. Phd.96A: "...I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature (σοφίας, ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν)." Euthyd.293D: "...by knowing one thing I know all...and as I know everything, I have that knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom (καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σοφόν;)." For the broad general use in Isocrates and Plato cf. e.g. Isoc.1,19: σοφία γὰρ μόνον τῶν κτημάτων ἀθάνατον. 11,24: μάλιστα δ' ἄξιον ἐπαίνεϊν καὶ θαυμάζειν τὴν εὐσέβειαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θεραπείαν. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς οὕτω κατεσχημάτισαν ὥστ' ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τιν' ἀρετὴν ἐκὼλαμβάνεσθαι κτλ. 15,270: "It remains to tell you about 'wisdom' (σοφίας) and 'philosophy' (φιλοσοφίας)." Pl.Rep.443E: "Wisdom the science that presides over such conduct (σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην)." Lg.689D; ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, etc. Cf. also X.MEM.3.9.4: "Between Wisdom (σοφίαν) and Prudence (σωφροσύνην) he drew no distinction; but if man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent (σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα) etc." - As compared with this broad use A.'s definition marks a limiting of the word to a very definite field.

16

EN1141a19: "Wisdom (σοφία) must be a combination of Intelligence

Analytics,¹⁷ namely, that a man knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which that conviction rests are known to him with certainty..."¹⁸ A.'s usage again represents a limitation over against popular usage as well as the broad and less technical use of Plato, with whom ἐπιστήμη, σοφία, and φρόνησις frequently are virtual synonyms.¹⁹ A.'s definition and use of the word is, however, in line with two main trends in the development of the meaning of the word in general usage, the one "to know how to do things", - appearing in that aspect of A.'s ἐπιστήμη which represents the ability to reason correctly by the deductive method, and the other "sure knowledge", - appearing in²⁰ A.'s restriction of ἐπιστήμη to the field of necessary truth.

(νοῦς) and Scientific Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)."

¹⁷Cf. APo.71b9 ff.: "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could be no other than it is."

¹⁸EN1140b31: "Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity, and demonstrated Truths and all Scientific Knowledge (since this involves reasoning-λόγος) are derived from first principles." Cf. also Metaph.1061b30. The distinction from φρόνησις is stated EN1142a28: "It is clear that Prudence is not the same as Scientific Knowledge; for as has been said, it apprehends particular things, since the thing to be done is an ultimate particular thing."

¹⁹Cf. e.g. Pl.Phlb.21D: εἰ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὐτῷ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν κεκτημένος κτλ.. and supra under σοφία. For the wider Platonic use cf. also Rep.477B: ἐκ' ἅλλω ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐκ' ἄλλω ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν ἁλλήν δύναμιν ἐκάτερα τὴν αὐτῆς. Phdr.247D: ἅτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῶ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτῳ τρεπομένη καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς... Smp.202A: "You know... that to have correct opinion (ὁρθῶς δοξάζειν), if you can give no reason for it, is neither full knowledge (ἐπίστασθαι)...nor yet ignorance... So correct opinion, I take it, is just in that position, between understanding (φρονήσεως) and ignorance." 210D: "...and turning rather towards the main ocean of the beautiful may by contemplation of this bring forth in all their splendor many fair fruits of discourse and meditation in a plentiful crop of philosophy; until

The other component part of σοφία is νοῦς, "intelligence". A. gives the following brief definition of this sense of νοῦς (EN 1141a8): εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις

with the strength and increase there acquired he describes a certain single knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) connected with a beauty yet to be told."

²⁰ That ἐπιστήμη represents not merely the ability to do a thing (τέχνη, σοφία), but emphasizes rather the intellectual and theoretical aspects of making and doing, appears in such a passage as Pl. Phdr. 269D: εἰ μὲν σοὶ ὑπάρχει φύσει ρητορικῶ εἶναι, ἔσει ρήτωρ ἔλλογιμός, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην. For the common use of the word "to know how to do something" cf. e.g. Bacch. 9, 38: μύριαι δ' ἀνδρῶν ἐπιστάται πέλονται. Eur. fr. 522, 3: εἰ κερκίδων μὲν ἀνδράσιν μέλοι πόνος γυναιξὶ δ' ὄπλων ἐμπέσοιεν ἡδοναί· ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης γὰρ ἐκπεπτωκότες κεῖνοι τ' ἂν οὐδὲν εἶεν οὐθ' ἡμεῖς ἔτι. (Cf. Snell, Die Ausdrücke fuer den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, p. 83 ff.). Soph. Ph. 1057: τὴνδ' ἐπιστήμην ἔχων i.e. drawing the bow. Thuc. 1, 121: "We shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and as soon as we have brought our skill (ἐπιστήμην) to a parity with theirs..." Isoc. 1, 28: ἔστι δὲ (πλοῦτος) χρήματα μὲν τοῖς ἀπολαύειν ἐπισταμένοις, κτήματα δὲ τοῖς κτᾶσθαι δυναμένοις. 13, 3: "They attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know (εἰσονται) what to do in life and through this knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) will become happy and prosperous." 15, 185: "Neither class of teachers is in possession of a science (ἐπιστήμη) by which they can make capable athletes or capable orators out of whomsoever they please." Dem. 19, 197: "She did not know how to sing (οὐτ' ἐπισταμένης)." 8, 60: "You will never learn (ἐπιστήσεσθε) how to be slaves." Pl. Phlb. 55D: "Let us consider whether in the manual arts one part is more allied to knowledge (ἐπιστήμης ἐχόμενον) and the other less." Plt. 308C: "Whether any constructive science (τῶν συνθητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν) voluntarily composes any, even the most worthless, of its works out of good and bad materials, or every science (πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη) invariably rejects the bad, etc." For the sense "sure knowledge" cf. e.g. Hdt. 5, 42: ...εὐ δὲ ἐπίστατο κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην αὐτὸς σχήσων τὴν βασιληίην. Aesch. Pr. 840: "For all time to come a recess of the sea, be well assured (σαφῶς ἐπίστασ'), shall bear the name Ionian." Soph. Aj. 1370: "...of this be well assured (εὐ ἐπίστασ')." O.T. 115: "But you, ...having in past days known or seen the herd, may better by sure knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) my surmise." Isoc. 13, 16: "To obtain a

ἔστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μὴθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶ-
 ναι (sc. τῶν ἀρχῶν).²¹ λέγω δὲ τριῶν, πρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην, σοφίαν,-
 λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. This special sense of "the faculty
 of rational intuition whereby it correctly apprehends (by a process
 of intuition²²) undemonstrable first principles" (Rackham), is the
 narrowest sense of the word as used by A. A wider sense appears
 EN1139a18: "Now there are three elements in the soul which control
 action and the attainment of truth: namely sensation, intellect,
 and desire (αἰσθησις νοῦς ὁρεξις)." This is the more common use
 of the word in A., and represents the rational part of the soul
 as a whole whose function is thought in general (διάνοιχ). For
 this usage cf. also the discussion νοῦς in the De Anima (De An.429
 a25: λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ λαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ). But EN1143b1
 the word is used in a still different sense as νοῦς πρακτικός,
 "practical intelligence"; it is here directly joined with πρόνησις
 and thus applied to the sphere of the contingent.²³ This practical

knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) of the elements out of which...we make dis-
 courses." Dem.19,217: "...after reviewing transactions that lie
 within the knowledge of all (ἂ πάντας ἐπίστασθε)." Pl.Phd.73C:
 "...when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection?" - 76B:
 "When a man knows can he give an account of what he knows (περὶ ὃ
 ἐπίσταται) or not?" Plt.301B: "And again when one man rules accord-
 ing to laws and imitates the scientific (τὸν ἐπιστήμονα) ruler,
 we call him king, making no distinction in name between the single
 ruler who rules by science (μετ' ἐπιστήμης) and him who rules by
 opinion..."

²¹ If then the qualities whereby we attain truth and are never led
 into falsehood, whether about things invariable or things variable,
 are Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence, and
 if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles can-
 not be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge,
 Prudence, and Wisdom, it remains that first principles must be ap-
 prehended by Intelligence."

²² Cf. EN1139b28: "Now induction supplies a first principle or uni-
 versal, deduction works from (ἐκ) universals; therefore there are
 first principles from which deduction starts, which cannot be prov-
 ed by deduction, therefore they are reached by induction."

²³ "Also Intelligence (νοῦς) apprehends the ultimates in both as-
 pects - since ultimates as well as primary definitions are gras-
 ped by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations
 Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions; in

intelligence is also defined De An.433a14: "By intelligence we mean that which calculates the means to an end, that is, the practical intellect, which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at which it aims (νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκὰ τοῦ λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει). Both the theoretical and the practical uses of the word by A. have a background in general Greek usage. The word is used broadly in the sense of "mind" in general; cf. e.g. Il.15,461: οὐ λῆθε Διὸς πυκινὸν νόον.. Od.1,3: πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω. Pind.P.8,18: ὃς εὖμενεῖ νόῳ Ξεναρκεῖον ἔδεκτο Κίρραθεν ἕστεφανώμενον. Soph.O.C.1768: ἀλλ' εὐ τὰδ' ἔχει κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνῳ, ταῦτ' ἂν ἀπαρκοῖ. Pl.Euthyphro 3E: ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην. The elevation of the term into philosophic language begins with Xenophanes; cf. 25: ἄλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. Cf. also Parm.16,2: ὥς γὰρ ἐκάστωτ' ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων τῶς νοδὸς ἀνθρωποῖσι παρίσταται. Democr.112: θείου νοῦ τὸ ἀεὶ τι διαλογίζεσθαι καλόν. For Plato cf. e.g. Ti.51D: εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθῆς ἔστων δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἶδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ' ὥς τις φαίνεται δόξα ἀληθῆς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὅποσα ἂν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα θετέον βεβαιόητα. - In general usage the practical aspect appears to predominate: cf. e.g. Il. 20,133: μὴ χαλέπαινε πάρεκ νόον (senselessly). Hdt.8,86: τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οὕτε ταταγμένων ἔπι οὕτε σὺν νόῳ ποιεόντων οὐδέν. Soph.O.T. 550: εἰ τοι νομίσεις κτήμα τὴν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι τι τοῦ νοῦ χωρὶς, οὐκ ὁρθῶς φρονεῖς. Pl.Lg.887E: ὥς φαίνεται ἂν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται and the use of the phrase νοῦν ἔχειν, "to be sensible", e.g. Soph. Tr.553: ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ὀργαίνειν καλὸν γυναῖκα νοῦν ἔχουσαν, etc.

εὐβουλία is the first of the component parts of φρόνησις to be discussed in connection with φρόνησις. In A.'s treatment the place occupied by the two words is almost the same; when εὐβουλία has been discussed, it seems to cover the same ground as φρόνησις. A. states his conclusion of the discussion in a passage that is made unclear by uncertainty of the antecedent of οὗ. (EN1142 b33). Greenwood gives a careful and detailed interpretation of EN1142a31 ff., where the two terms are distinguished, and reaches the following conclusion (op. cit. p.66): "εὐβουλία seems to be re-

practical inferences (ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς), it apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact and the minor premiss, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence (νοῦς).

garded as a quality of the searching, unsatisfied, inquiring mind. But the mind is not always engaged in the activity of searching, and when it is not, the quality of εὐβουλία does not seem to be considered to attach to it; the quality comes and goes with the activity. But φρόνησις is a quality of the satisfied as well as of the inquiring mind." p.67: "εὐβουλία must, it seems, be distinguished from φρόνησις as part from whole: in fact, it might be said: ἡ εὐβουλία καὶ ἡ φρόνησις διαφέρουσιν· ἡ γὰρ εὐβουλία φρόνησις τις ἐστίν -not, however, of course, φρόνησις κατὰ μέρος, but a part or aspect of φρόνησις ἅπλως." A.'s definition and use of the word here is in harmony with general Greek usage; cf. e.g. Aesch.Pr.1035: "Never deem stubbornness better than wise counsel (εὐβουλίας). Soph. Ant.1050: "How far is good counsel (εὐβουλία) the best of goods?" (opp. μὴ φρονεῖν). Thuc.1,78: "We urge you, while wise counsels (εὐβουλία) are still a matter of free choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty...but to let our differences be settled by arbitration." Isoc.3,8: "While we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage (εὐβουλία) those who most skilfully debate their problems in their own minds." 9,46: στρατηγικός δὲ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους εὐβουλία...διαφέρειν. Pl.Rep. 428B: "And surely this very thing, good counsel (εὐβουλία), is a form of wisdom (ἐπιστήμη τις)" - Cf. Professor Shorey's note, Loeb ed. Thuc.1,84: "It is because of our orderly temper that we are brave in war and wise in counsel (εὐβουλοί)." X.Ag.11,9: "Courage ...was joined with prudence (εὐβουλίας) rather than boldness."

σύνεσις is distinguished from φρόνησις as being μὴ πρακτική; it is the judgment at the end of a reasoning process as to whether the opinions presented are right or wrong. It judges the results of the deliberations of others, but does not end in an ἐπιτακτικὸν conclusion of the form: "I must do this". So it is not φρόνησις, but a part of φρόνησις in that it leads to the command which φρόνησις issues. σύνεσις is generally used in the sense

²⁴Cf. EN1143a8 ff.: "Understanding (σύνεσις) deals with...those things about which one may be in doubt and deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same objects as Prudence. Understanding is not, however, the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands, since its end is a statement of what we ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding merely makes good judgments (κρίτιξη μόνον). - Thus Understanding does not mean either the possession or the acquisition of Prudence; but when we employ the faculty of opinion (τῇ δόξει) to judge (κρίνειν) what another person says about matters that are in the sphere of Prudence, we are

of intellectual grasp or penetration, insight, understanding; of. e.g. Pl.Cra.412A: σύνεσις δ' αὖ οὕτω μὲν δέξειεν ἄν ὥσπερ συλλογισμοῦς εἶναι ("a kind of reckoning together"). 411A. Hdt.2,5: δῖλα γὰρ καὶ μὴ προσκρούσαντι, ἰδόντι δέ, ὅστις γε σύνεσιν ἔχει, ὅτι Αἴγυπτος ἐς τὴν Ἑλληνεῖς ναυτίλλονται ἐστὶ...δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ. Eur.Or.1524: "Well thou say'st: thy wit (σύνεσις) hath saved thee." X.Cyn.13,14: "The huntsman's labors are in vain, unless by greater perseverance and by much intelligence (πολλῇ συνέσει) he can overcome them." Dem.3,3: "Most of your chances have escaped you rather from a disinclination to do your duty than from a failure to understand (συνιέναι) it." Pl.Sph.228D: "Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of the soul that aims at truth, when the understanding (σύνεσις) passes beside the mark." For the wider use in Plato cf. Cra.411A: "I should like to examine the correctness of the noble words that relate to virtue, such as wisdom (φρόνησις), intelligence (σύνεσις), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and all the others of that sort." Phlb.19D: "You...assert that the good which is rightly to be called better than pleasure is mind (νοῦς) knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), intelligence (σύνεσις), art (τέχνη), and all their kin." - σύνεσις is a favorite word with Thucydides; cf. e.g. 1,138: "For by native insight (ἐννεσίᾳ ...ἐννέσει), not reinforced by earlier or later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation (δὲ ἐλαχίστης βούλης), both a shrewd judge (κράτιστος γνώμην) of the immediate present and wise in forecasting (εἰκαστής) what would happen in the most distant future." 1,75: "Considering then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment (προθυμία...καὶ γνώμης ἐννέσειας) which we displayed at that time." 2,62: "And where fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of contempt is to render courage (τολμᾶν) more effective through intelligence (ἡ ἐννέσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρώτερον παρέχεται), that puts its trust not so much in hope, which is strongest in perplexity, as in reason supported by the facts (γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων), which gives a surer insight (πρόνοια) into the future." 3,82: "He who succeeded in a plot was clever (εὐχαριστός), and he who detected one was still shrewder (δεινότερος)."

said to understand (ἐννιέναι),...in the same way as learning a thing (μάνθανειν) is termed understanding it when we are employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). - For this familiar use of μανθάνειν in the sense of understanding what another person says cf. e.g. Pl.Men.84B: "Tell me, boy: here we have a square of four feet, have we not?...You understand (μανθίνεις)."

²⁵ On Thucydides' use of σύνεσις and γνώμη cf. Shorey, "The Implicit

γνώμη, "judgment", "consideration", is also distinguished from πρόνῃσις, but the definition EN1143a19 is not clear. The word as used here by A. has only a restricted and good meaning, ὁρθὴ κρίσις, not any kind of κρίσις, and κρίσις τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, not κρίσις of anything. Its basic meaning 'opinion', 'judgment', is here fused with that of συγγνώμη, 'consideration', 'fair-mindedness'.²⁶ For this limited use of γνώμη outside of A. cf. e.g. Dem.20,118: "Where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide according to the best of your judgment (γνώμη τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ κρίνεις). 23,96: γνώμη τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δικάσειν ὁμοῶκεσιν, ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξ' ἀφ' ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται. For συγγνώμη cf. Hdt.1,116: κατέβαινε ἐς λίτας τε καὶ συγγνώμην ἐωυτῷ μελεῦων ἔχειν αὐτόν. Pl. Rep.391E: "Every man will be very lenient (ἐυγνώμην ἔξει) with his own misdeeds if he is convinced etc."

δαιμόντης, "cleverness", is distinguished from πρόνῃσις EN1144a28 as follows: "There is a certain faculty called cleverness (δαιμόντης), which is the capacity for doing these things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty; if base, it is mere knavery (πανουργία); this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever. Now this faculty is not identical with Prudence (πρόνῃσις), but Prudence implies it." In common usage the word is frequently applied to skill in oratory; cf. e.g. Isoc.1,4: "Those who point out to the young, not by what means

Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides", T.A.P.A. vol.24, p.76: "The nomenclature of this intellectual principle is noteworthy. Thucydides does not use σοφός with its earliest suggestion of skill and its later connotation of the higher wisdom. He does not employ the πρόνῃσις and προσις of Plato and the dramatists with their moral and religious coloring, nor νοῦς with its intellectual associations. His words are γνώμη, 'mind', 'judgment', ὑπερσῆσις, 'understanding', the intellect that penetrates shams; λογισμός and its paronyms, the calculating reason. - His most characteristic laudatory epithet, applied to various men, is οὐκ ἔχοντες, not unintelligent, they could see through a mill-stone."

²⁶ EN1143a14: "The quality termed consideration (γνώμη -, cf. Rackham's note), in virtue of which men are said to be considerate (ἐυγνώμονας), or to show consideration for others (forgiveness - συγγνώμην) is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable. This is indicated by our saying that the equitable (ἐπιεικῆ) man is specially considerate for others (forgiving - συγγνωμικόν), and

they may cultivate skill in oratory (τὴν δεινότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις)." Thuc.3,27: "Thus then we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits (δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι) as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment." The derogatory meaning of the word, associated by A. with πανουργία, appears frequently; cf. e.g. Pl.Tht.177A: δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι. Dem.1,9: πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρῆσθαι. Isoc.15,230: "If it be true that cleverness in speech results in plotting against other people's property..." 12,121: "For what among crimes that are unparalleled in their wickedness and cruelty (ἀνοσιότητι καὶ δεινότητι)..." Dem.18,144: "And you will form an idea of the supreme craftiness (ὄση δεινότης ἦν) of Philip."

εὐστοχία, "skill in conjecture", and ἀγχίνοια, "quickness of mind" are distinguished from εὐβουλία M1142b3 as follows: "Nor yet is it (εὐβουλία) skill in conjecture (εὐστοχία): for this operates without conscious calculation, and rapidly, whereas deliberating takes a long time. and there is a proverb that execution should be swift but deliberation slow. Again, Deliberative Excellence is not the same as quickness (ἀγχίνοια), which is a form of skill in conjecture." ἀγχίνοια is defined APo.89b10: "Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously (ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκήπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου)." ²⁷ For εὐστοχία as the less definite term cf. Pl.Lg.950B: "Even in the wicked ones there resides a divine and correct intuition (θεῖον δῆ τι καὶ εὐστοχον), whereby a vast number even of the extremely wicked distinguish aright...between the better man and the worse." 792D: "It ought to embrace that middle state of cheerfulness (as I termed it a moment ago), which - as we all rightly suppose, on the strength

that it is equitable to show consideration for others (forgiveness - συγγνώμην) in certain cases; but consideration which judges rightly what is equitable, judging rightly meaning judging what is truly equitable."

²⁷ ἀγχίνοια is further explained as follows APo.89b11: "It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned toward the sun, and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she borrows her light from him; or observed somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and divined that he was borrowing money, or that the friendship of these people sprang from a common enmity. In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes, the middle terms."

of an inspired utterance (κατὰ τινα μαντείας φήμην εὐστόχως πάντες προσαγορεύομεν) - is the very condition of God himself." For ἀγχίνοια as illustrating A.'s definition cf. Od.13,332: ...οὐνεκ' ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων. Pl.Chrm.160A: ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡσυχία; Phdr.239A: "...the poor speaker (is inferior) to the eloquent, the slow of wit (βραδύς) to the clever (ἀγχίνου)." Lg.747: "Its (i.e. mathematics) chief advantage is that it wakes up the man who is by nature drowsy and slow of wit (βυστάζοντα καὶ ἡμιθῆ πύσει) and makes him quick to learn (εὐμαθή), mindful (μνήμινα), and sharp witted (ἀγχίνου)." Tht.144A: οἱ τε ὀξεῖς...καὶ ἀγχίνοὶ καὶ μνήμονες.

τέχνη, "art", as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη is (EN1140a11) "The same thing as a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly (ταῦτόν ἐν εἴῃ τέχνη καὶ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική - as distinct from πρακτική). Cf. also EN1140a21: "Art, therefore, as has been said, is a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly. Its opposite, lack of art (ἄτεχνία), is a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons falsely." A. endeavors to draw a line between τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, assigning the former to the field of ποίησις, and ἐπιστήμη to the intellectual operations in the field of necessary truth. General usage, however, does not follow this distinction, since ἐπιστήμη (vide supra) is used also of activities in the field of ποίησις: the restriction, however, of τέχνη to the field of ποίησις (in the widest sense) is in accord with general usage. Cf. e.g. Isoc.12, 226: "They have striven to set the Hellenes at variance with each other, reducing this practice, as it were, to a fine art (ἄσπερ τέχνην ἔχοντας ἐποίησαν)." "

In connection with developing his doctrine of the will in the third book of E.N. A. distinguishes ἐκούσιον and προαίρεσις as follows (1111b7 ff.): ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεόν τοῦ ἐκούσιου· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῷα κοινῶναί, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαιρνήσις ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. - The distinction is fully in accord with Greek usage. For examples illustrating voluntary action that is distinct from προαίρεσις cf. e.g. PA657b1: "...blinking is not performed from deliberate intention but from natural instinct - καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ προαιρέσεως ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε." Hipp.Aph.1251: κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ μὴ δακρύειν. Galen 19,171: τὴν φύσιν ἐκούσιον καὶ οὐ παθοῦσιν τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν. προαίρεσις, "deliberate or preferential choice", is defined by A. as a technical term EN1113a9: ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτικοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ'.

ὁμῶν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις αὖν εἴη βουλευτική θρεξις τῶν ἡμῶν. ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. The background in common Greek speech for this technical meaning of προαίρεσις we may find in such expressions as Isoc.1,10: "In the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention...and freedom of choice (προαίρεσις) than compulsion (ἀνάγκη)." Dem.21,44: τοῖς ἐξ προαιρέσεως ὑβρίσταις. 21,66: ἔχθρα δ' ἔλαυνοντά τινα ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἐφ' ἅπασι, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν κρείττε τῶν νόμων οὖσαν ἐνδεικνύμενον, Ἡρόκληις βαρὺ κοῦχί δίκαιον ἐστὶν οὐδὲ συμφέρν ὑμῖν. 44,57: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ βουλήσεως τῆς τοῦ διαμαρτυροῦντος γίγνονται. Lysurg.148: τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀδικημάτων. 102: "...if it had depended on his choice (κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν), the temples would have been empty." The wider non-technical use of "making a choice" that is common in Greek literature (cf. e.g. Isoc.12,11: "...choosing as my field - τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος - not petty matters, but the affairs of Hellas." Dem.6,16: "...he was not forced into his former measures, but adopted them by choice - οὐτε...βιασθεῖς...ἐκ προαιρέσεως." Lysurg.100: "Euripides chose this myth as subject for poetry." Pl.La.190D: "Which of the parts of virtue shall we choose," Prm143B: "...in each case we select - ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθα - two things which may properly be called both") appears also in A. Cf. e.g.Pol.1284a2: πολίτης...καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν. 1298b27: ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἡ προαιρεῖσθαι τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, εἰ κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχεῖον ὅλον ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὐκ καλοῦσι προβόλους καὶ νομοφύλακας.

προαίρεσις and ἐπιθυμία are distinguished EN1111b12 ff.: "The irrational animals do not exercise choice (οὐ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις), but they do feel desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) and also passion (θυμός). Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire (ἐπιθυμῶν) but not from choice (προαιρούμενος), and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire. And desire considers an object as pleasant or painful, choice does not." - When A. restricts προαίρεσις to moral choice he gives the word a restricted technical meaning as compared with general usage. His use of ἐπιθυμία is fully in accord with common usage, where the word, as here and in the fuller discussions of ἐγκράτεια etc. in Book VII refers especially to desires that originate in the physical nature. For this use cf. e.g. X.Mem.1.3.5: "He ate just sufficient food that he found appetite the best sauce (ὥστε τὴν ἐπι-

θυμῖαν τοῦ σίτου ἄφρον αὐτῷ εἶναι)." Thuc.2,52: "...half dead people rolled about in the streets and, in their longing (ἐπιθυμίᾳ) for water, near all the fountains." For a wider use cf. e.g. X.Mem. 1.2.15: "These two men wanted to adopt (ἐπιθυμήσαντε) the simple life of Socrates." Pl.Prt.313D: "Those who take their doctrines the round of your cities, hawking them about to any odd purchaser who desires them (τῷ ἑστὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι)." Isoc.8,28: "All men crave their advantage (ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος)...but do not know the kind of conduct which leads to this end."

A distinction is further made between προαίρεσις and βούλησις, EN111b19 ff.: "Again, choice is certainly not wish (βούλησις), though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. Also, we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency... . Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end...speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our control." The distinction is in accord with general Greek usage. For A.'s definition of βούλησις cf. Eur.H.F.1305: ἔπραξε γὰρ βούλησιν ἣν ἐβούλετο ἄνδρ' 'Ελλάδος τὸν πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν βάθροισι ἄνα κάτω στρέψασα. Thuc.3,39: γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐλπίσαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ τῆς βουλῆσεως, πόλεμον ἤραντο, ἰσχύον ἀξιοῦσαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθεσθαι. 6,78: "...if anyone...wishes that the Syracusans shall be humbled, he indulges as wish that is not within human power to attain." For the verb cf. Il.24,226: εἰ δὲ μοι αἶσα τεθνήσκειν παρὰ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων, βούλομαι. X.An.2.6.6: ταῦτα οὖν φιλοπολέμου μοι δοκεῖ ἄνδρὸς ἔργα εἶναι, ἅστις ἔξον μὲν εἰρήνην ἔχειν ἄνευ αἰσχύνης καὶ βλάβης αἰρεῖται πολεμεῖν· ἔξον δὲ ραθυμεῖν βούλεται ποιεῖν ὥστε πολεμεῖν, ἔξον δὲ χρήματα ἔχειν ἀκινδύνως αἰρεῖται πολεμῶν μέισιν ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Hdt.3,40: καὶ ὡς βούλομαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τῶν ἂν κῆθωμαι τὸ μὲν τι εὐτυχέειν τῶν πράγματων, τὸ δὲ προσπταίειν, καὶ οὕτω διαφέρειν τὸν αἰῶνα ἐνάλλαξ πρήσων ἢ εὐτυχέειν τὰ πάντα.

A. distinguishes Βούλευσις and ζήτησις as follows (EN112 b29): ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος δοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διαγράμμι...φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ. ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις. - ζήτησις here appears as a technical term for the seeking of a solution to a problem, βούλευσις as deliberation about the choice of means to the accomplishment of a practical end. βούλευσις as a noun occurs only here in this sense, but the meaning here given the word is in harmony with the common use of the verb. Cf. Thuc.

3,44: νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μάλλον βουλευέσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. Pl.Phdr.231A: οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ἔκοντες, ὥς ἂν ἄριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων βουλευσάιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῶν εἶποιούσιν. Rep.604C: "In the way of what? he asked. - τῷ βουλευέσθαι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονός καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἶρετ' βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχαιν. 428D: ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἀρτί ὑφ' ὑμῶν οἰκισθεῖη παρὰ τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἣ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὅλης, ὅντινα τρόπον αὐτῇ τε πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ. - For ζήτησις in the technical sense cf. Pl.Cra.406A: τὰς τε Μούσας τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μάσθαι, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα - τοῦτο ἐπωνόμασεν. Ap.29C: ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρέβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν. Phdr.244C: "So also, when they gave a name to the investigation (ζήτησιν) of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds...". Ti.47A: "But as it is, the vision of day and night and of months and circling years has created the art of number and has given us ...means of research (ζήτησις) into the nature of the Universe." The wider, non-technical use of ζήτησις may be seen from Isoc.15, 82: "At the time when the human race was beginning to come into existence and to settle togethr in cities, it was natural that their searching (ζήτησις) should have been much the same thing, - i.e. the making of laws and the composing of speeches (παρακλησίαν τινὰ τὴν ζήτησιν)." Thuc.1,20: οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας.

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